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Personal discount rates can be defined as the rate at 
which Marines trade current dollars for future dollars.  
This research attempts to fill in the gaps in previous 
discount rate studies where Marine Corps data were omitted, 
by determining the personal discount rates for each 
individual who separated from the Marine Corps under the 
SSB or VSI voluntary separation payment programs between 
1992 and 1997.  This study also determined those personal, 
professional, and economic traits that had a significant 
influence on Marines during their separation payment option 
decisions.  The findings of this research are similar to 
previous studies, indicating that the methodology applied 
in this study is accurate.  The implications of this 
research for the Marine Corps are that manpower planners 
can use the determined personal discount rates to create 
policies that can target Marines who possess certain 
personal or professional characteristics for reduction or 
retention, thereby assisting the efforts to create a 
balanced and capable Marine Corps in the future.  Planners 
can also use this research to anticipate the effect of 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND  
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 reduced the 
need for large U.S. military forces.  Accordingly, in the 
1991 Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated a 
Department of Defense (DoD) wide reduction in active duty 
endstrength.  The amount of personnel to be cut was 400,000 
by fiscal year 1995 (FY95), a 25 percent decrease in total 
forces.  Congress also stipulated that involuntary 
separations should be kept at a minimum.  DoD developed two 
monetary incentive programs to be used to enable them to 
attain the required reduction in numbers, while limiting 
involuntary separations (Warner and Pleeter 2001, 34). 
The first program to be implemented was the Voluntary 
Separations Incentive (VSI), which was an annuity equal to 
2.5 percent of annual pay multiplied by the service 
member’s years of service.  VSI payments would be received 
for a period equal to two times the years of service, and 
would not increase over time to compensate for inflation.  
The second program to be introduced was the Selective 
Separation Benefit (SSB), which was a lump sum payment of 
15 percent of annual base pay times years of service (Asch 
and Warner 2001, 5). 
The offering of these two programs presented 
economists with the opportunity to evaluate the personal 
characteristics, and to determine the personal discount 
rates, of each service member who was making real 
separation decisions.  It was an opportunity to see if 
economic theory would be supported for a group of people 
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that were representative of the country’s population 
(Warner and Pleeter 2001, 33). 
B. PURPOSE 
This research evaluates the discount rate at which 
Marines exchanged present dollars for future dollars.  The 
objective is to determine a personal discount rate for each 
Marine who separated from the Marine Corps under the VSI or 
SSB voluntary separation programs that were offered between 
1992 and 1997, and then compare those rates with rates 
found in previous studies.  This research includes detailed 
multivariate and economic analyses to determine and examine 
the economic and personal factors that influenced Marines 
in their personal discount rate decisions. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The study done by Warner and Pleeter incorporated 
Army, Navy and Air Force data.  The Marine Corps was not 
included in their study due to improper eligibility 
reporting by this branch of service.  This thesis follows 
closely the methodology used in the Warner and Pleeter 
study to determine the Marine Corps rates that were not 
determined in that study.  The primary research goals of 
this thesis are to identify the personal discount rates 
used by Marines in their decision about which of the two 
separation programs, VSI or SSB, to take; and to identify 
personal characteristics that made an impact on their 
voluntary separation option choice.   
Secondary research questions include: 
• Could separation programs such as VSI and SSB 
provide the Marine Corps with an additional force-
shaping tool to encourage voluntary separation? 
• Is there applicability to the other services? 
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D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
Through use of the Marine Corps’ Total Force Data 
Warehouse (TFDW), it is possible to collect the demographic 
and military characteristics of each Marine who separated 
under either of the VSI or SSB programs.  From these data, 
it is possible to determine: 1) The discount rate that each 
individual used in his or her decision about which of the 
two separation payment options to take, and 2) Those 
personal characteristics that significantly influenced the 
Marine’s decision to take either the VSI or SSB payments.   
Knowing the discount rates and personal 
characteristics that influence a Marine’s decision about 
the amount of current dollars he or she is willing to trade 
for future dollars is beneficial.  If the Marine Corps is 
able to determine personal discount rates for each Marine, 
manpower planners should be able to craft appropriate 
force-shaping tools.  Planners can create incentives that 
can be used to either encourage retention or separation, 
whichever is required at the time.  Knowing the appropriate 
amount of money needed to entice Marines to stay or leave 
will also ensure that the Marine Corps avoids paying 
consumer surpluses as they choose to separate or retain 
Marines.  Understanding the personal characteristics that 
influence a Marine’s decision will prove useful in that 
those characteristics can be evaluated by manpower 
planners, who can then create incentives that encourage 
separation or retention. 
E. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The scope of this thesis includes a review of personal 
discount rate studies and a multiple regression analysis 
using TFDW data. The goal of this thesis is to determine 
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the individual discount rates and personal characteristics 
of those Marines who chose to separate under either of the 
voluntary separation incentive programs.  This thesis 
concludes with a discussion of findings and recommendations 
for the usability of the model in explaining actual 
behavior and possible policy implications. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The study includes six chapters.  Chapter II reviews 
previous personal discount rate studies based on 
experimental and non-experimental data.  Chapter III 
introduces the data set used in the study and gives results 
of preliminary analysis.  Chapter IV describes the 
methodology and model specifications used in the 
multivariate analysis.  Chapter V presents the results of 
the multivariate probit and logit models.  Chapter VI 
includes a summary of the study, conclusions, limitations, 
and recommendations. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATE STUDIES 
1. Study by Steven Cylke, Mathew Goldberg, Paul 
Hogan and Lee Mairs (1982) 
In this paper, the authors evaluated the economic 
theory that suggests individuals discount annuity payments, 
making lump sum payments more likely to entice sailors to 
reenlist than annual installment payments.  The opportunity 
to test this theory arose when DoD changed the manner in 
which it paid reenlistment bonuses.  Before April 1, 1979 
such bonuses were paid once a year at the beginning of each 
year of reenlistment, but, after that date, the entire 
bonus was paid as a lump sum on the date of reenlistment.  
This change in policy provided economists with a chance to 
evaluate personal discount rates based upon reenlistment 
choices made by sailors who were eligible to receive up to 
$20,000 for reenlisting.  The authors studied the impact of 
bonuses on reenlistment rates before and after this change 
in policy to see what effect the lump sum payment method 
had on an individual’s reenlistment decision.  Then, once 
the lump sum payment effect was estimated, it was used to 
determine an implied discount rate (Cylke et al. 1982, 1). 
The data set used in this study comes from U.S. Navy 
reenlistment records that cover FY78 through FY80.  There 
were 87 Navy ratings with complete reenlistment records 
during this time period.  The authors pooled the annual 
data.  The data set includes one year under the original 
bonus payment policy, a year of transition to the new 
policy, and one year under the new bonus payment method 
(Cylke et al. 1982, 4). 
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The authors believed the reenlistment rate was a 
logistic function of the equation: 
 log[ /(1 )]R R Xb u− = +  
where R is a vector of reenlistment rates for each rating 
and b is the vector of coefficients of the independent 
variables.  The authors chose to use two different model 
specifications in this study.  In the first instance, dummy 
variables for the FY79 and FY80 observations were used to 
determine what influence time had on reenlistment 
decisions, not including the bonus multiple.  The second 
specification replaced the FY79 and FY80 dummy variables 
with a variable for the unemployment rate for males aged 
25-34.  The authors tried to determine the effect of time 
on reenlistment decisions by confining the effect to 
suggest itself through the unemployment rate.  Interaction 
variables linked the bonus multiple and fiscal year dummy 
variables, enabling the authors to see the effects of 
bonuses on reenlistment rates for the three different years 
being evaluated.  They also enabled them to evaluate 
whether or not the policy change led to increased rates of 
effectiveness for the bonuses (Cylke et al. 1982, 4-5). 
Table 1 highlights the resulting coefficients, t-
values, and partial effects from the regression analysis.  
This table can be used to determine the partial effects in 
specification 1, showing that annuity reenlistment bonuses 
were only 71 percent as effective as the lump sum bonuses 
paid in FY80.  The annuity reenlistment bonus effectiveness 




Table 1.   Results of Regression Analysis 









Intercept -.7941 5.98 - -.8569 3.23 - 
Bonus .1840 3.98 - .1914 5.96 - 
FY78 - - .044 - - .046 
FY79 -.0410 .25 .054 - - .054 
FY80 -.0166 .11 .062 - - .062 
Unemployment - - - .0081 .16 - 
Bonus * FY79 .0427 .69 - .0329 .76 - 
Bonus * FY80 .0747 1.23 - .0664 1.38 - 
R2 .343 .342 
N 261 261 
(After Cylke et al. 1982) 
 
The study then shifts its focus to determining the 
discount rate of the “marginal” reenlisting sailor, as 
implied by the difference in effectiveness on reenlistment 
rates between the lump sum and installment bonus payments.  
The authors address this problem by solving for the nominal 
discount rate, which they set equal to the real discount 
rate plus the expected rate of price inflation.  They then 
determine the real discount rate by subtracting the 
observed rate of inflation from the nominal discount rate.  
The authors determine their nominal discount rate by 
setting the following expression equal to the 71 percent 
relative bonus effectiveness, as determined from the 
partial effects in Table 1, and then solving for r: 
 4




+ − +  
Doing so resulted in a nominal discount rate, on 
average, of 29.1 percent.  Deducting the Consumer Price 
Index, which averaged 10.6 percent during the three years 
of the sample, produces a real marginal discount rate of 
18.5 percent (Cylke et al. 1982, 8). 
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The effects of progressive income taxation are 
evaluated next in the study.  Progressive income taxation 
implies that the sailor’s total tax costs are higher when 
the entire bonus is paid in one year.  The question 
addressed here is whether or not an increase in annual 
taxes, for one year, negates or minimizes the effectiveness 
of a lump sum bonus payment.  Even with increased taxes, a 
sailor may still prefer a one-time payout since deferred 
income must be discounted. 
The authors use this expression to determine how much 
the annuity bonus increases the discounted present value of 














B is the annual bonus installment, t is the taxes as a 
function of income, and Ii is taxable income not including 
the bonus.  On the other hand, the lump sum bonus increases 
the sailor’s present value by: 
 ' 14 (1 [ 4 ])B t I B− +  
The authors now combine these two expressions, set the 
new equation equal to 71 percent, and determine the 





1 [ ] 1.25 ( )





t I B r −=
− +
− + +∑  
The resulting discount rate exceeded the rate 
determined earlier, indicating that there are higher 
discount rates when progressive income taxation is taken 
into account.  This is because discounting now must yield 
the empirical effectiveness of lump sum bonuses, but do so 
9 
in the face of the tax disadvantage of one-time payments 
(Cylke et al. 1982, 11). 
The authors continue their evaluation of real discount 
rates by examining the effect of income averaging.  They 
want to determine if reenlisting sailors may decide to 
receive their lump sum payment over time so they have lower 
total tax payments.  The authors determine that the 
relative effectiveness of installment bonuses is determined 











B t t I r −=
− +
− − +∑  
This expression suggests a nominal discount rate of 
27.4 percent and correspondingly, a real discount rate of 
16.8 percent (Cylke et al. 1982, 14).  This rate is only 
1.7 percent lower than the previous estimate of 18.5 
percent, indicating that taxation has little impact on a 
sailor’s decision as long as the income averaging option 
exists. 
The authors conclude their study by addressing the 
implications of their estimated real personal discount 
rates on current bonus policy.  The authors found that the 
net present cost to the Navy is greater than the net 
present value to the sailor receiving the bonus.  They also 
determined that installments paid over time are not as 
efficient in enticing sailors to reenlist as lump sum 
bonuses.  These conclusions are based on the difference 
between their estimated real discount rate of approximately 
17 percent, and the Navy’s discount rate of about 10 
percent (Baumol 1968, Feldstein 1964, Marglin 1963). 
10 
Cylke et al. found that marginally, reenlisting 
sailors had a real discount rate of approximately 17 
percent, when inflation and progressive income taxation are 
taken into consideration.  They also determined that tax 
considerations had minimal effect on reenlistment rates 
providing sailors could “income average” their lump sum 
bonus payments (Cylke et al. 1982, 17).  The study also 
concludes that lump sum bonuses are a more cost efficient 
method to entice sailors to reenlist, compared to annuity 
payments, so long as the Navy’s real discount rate is below 
17 percent.  The authors also advise against a return to a 
policy of installment bonuses or a mixture of installment 
and lump sum payments.  These methods are more costly to 
the Navy and taxpayers than lump sum bonuses are, and do 
not achieve a higher reenlistment rate than lump sum 
bonuses. 
This study evaluated the effects of bonuses on 
retention rates offered to sailors during the FY78 to FY80 
time period.  The authors took the opportunity offered by a 
change in Navy policy to see if a lump sum bonus payment 
had an effect on reenlistment rates when compared to 
annuity bonus payments.  By determining the discount rate 
that set the present value of the lump sum payment equal to 
the present value of the annuity payment, Cylke et al. were 
able to estimate a personal discount rate for each sailor.  
They found that, marginally, enlisted sailors had a real 
discount rate of approximately 17 percent.  This discount 




concluded that lump sum bonus payments were more likely to 
entice a sailor to reenlist than monetary payments over 
time. 
2. Study by John Warner and Saul Pleeter (2001) 
The Warner and Pleeter study used the congressionally 
mandated military drawdown during FY92 to FY95 to estimate 
personal discount rates based on observing which of the two 
separation incentive options (VSI or SSB) was chosen by 
66,000 military personnel.  The data used in their study 
came from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).  DMDC’s 
data set matched “(1) the service reports of eligibility, 
(2) DMDC’s master file records containing information 
about, race, sex, education, rank, years of service, etc., 
and (3) Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS) records 
containing information about each service member’s military 
compensation and the separation payment actually received” 
(Warner and Pleeter 2001, 41). 
Warner and Pleeter began their evaluation by 
calculating a break-even discount rate (BEDR) for each 
individual in their sample.  Break-even discount rates are 
defined as the rate which makes the Present Value of the 
Annuity Payment equal to the Present Value of the Lump Sum 
Payment.  The authors used this formula to determine the 









t SSB t VSI BEDR
− −
=
− = − +∑  
Their model posited the discount rate to be a linear 
function of the observed characteristics of the individual 
12 
( χ ) and random error (ε ), where β  is a parameter 
estimate: 
 PDR χβ ε= +  
 
The probability of choosing the lump sum option could then 
be determined by the formula: 
 ( ) ( )P SSB P BEDRχβ ε= − > −  
The SSB option was chosen if PDR > BEDR (Warner and Pleeter 
2001, 38). 
Table 2 below lists the regressors used in the model 
along with their anticipated effect on the likelihood of 
the SSB option being chosen. 
 
Table 2.   Expected Effect of Independent Variables 





Mental Test Scores Negative 
Race Positive 
Gender Unknown 




Geographic Region Positive 




The authors separated their data set into two groups: 
officers and enlisted, and ran a bivariate probit model to 
determine estimates for each of the independent variables.  
Overall, the effects of wages, education and age on the 
likelihood of selecting the SSB option were all found to be 
negative as had been anticipated.  Those with more 
education had a significantly lower likelihood to take the 
lump sum and to have lower discount rates, as were older 
personnel.  Blacks were estimated to be significantly more 
likely to take the lump sum payment than other races.  
Having more dependents had a positive effect on the 
probability of selecting the SSB option as had been 
anticipated, but the likelihood of selecting the lump sum 
decreased with age.  Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 
effects were mixed.  Combat arms personnel had a higher 
separation probability than non-combat arms individuals.  
The study also found that enlisted personnel had a much 
higher average tendency to select the SSB, but the 
inclination to do so varied considerably with personal 
traits. 
Specifically for the officers, it was found that the 
break-even discount rate had a negative and highly 
significant effect on an officer’s decision to take the SSB 
payment.  This implies that as the break-even discount rate 
increases, the less likely an officer will be to take the 
lump sum payment.  Warner and Pleeter also found that black 
officers were more likely to take the SSB than nonwhites, 
and that as the officer’s education level increases the 
likelihood of that person choosing the SSB decreases.  As 
the number of dependents increases so does the likelihood 
14 
that the officer will take the SSB option, but this trend 
declines with age.  The propensity to choose the SSB 
payment was found to be greater for officers in tactical 
operations, than for those officers who had different MOSs.  
Officers were less likely to choose the lump sum payment 
option as the size of the after-tax lump sum amount 
increased, revealing that individuals do discount larger 
amounts at lower discount rates than they do small values 
(Warner and Pleeter 2001, 45-46). 
The enlisted personnel model produced similar results 
to those found for the officer ranks.  The break-even 
discount rate coefficients were again negative and highly 
significant.  Enlisted personnel were much more likely to 
choose the SSB payment, and black enlisted were, like their 
officer counterparts, more likely to take the lump sum 
payment than whites.  Enlisted personnel with higher 
education levels were found to be less probable to take the 
SSB and they had lower discount rates just as officers did.  
The effect of having dependents on the enlisted payment 
option decision was not as important as it was for 
officers.  Those enlisted personnel with the greater number 
of dependents were more likely to take the lump sum payment 
due to their higher discount rates.  Male enlisted 
personnel were more likely than their female counterparts 
to take the SSB and they tended to have higher discount 
rates as well.  Individuals in the two highest mental 
categories were found to be less likely to choose the SSB 
payment option than others, and they were found to have 
lower discount rates.  As with officers, those enlisted 
personnel in combat arms MOS had a higher propensity to 
take the lump sum payment and to have higher discount 
15 
rates.  The year in which the individual separated was also 
significant, with those separating in 1992 having a higher 
propensity to opt for the lump sum payment (Warner and 
Pleeter 2001, 47-48). 
Warner and Pleeter inserted these estimated 
coefficients into the original model, PDR χβ ε= + , to 
determine personal discount rates for each individual in 
the sample.  Table 3 provides a summary of their results. 
 
Table 3.   Mean Nominal Discount Rates 









All 0.104 0.187 0.354 0.536 
Stayers 0.099 0.182 0.350 0.525 
Leavers 0.129 0.210 0.369 0.572 
All in YOS:     
  7 0.205 0.291 0.410 0.714 
  9 0.159 0.232 0.381 0.607 
  11 0.111 0.180 0.353 0.527 
  13 0.046 0.132 0.327 0.459 
  15 0 0.099 0.294 0.389 
(Warner and Pleeter 2001, 48) 
 
They found that the average nominal discount rate for 
the officers was 0.104 while enlisted personnel had a rate 
of 0.354.  Table 3 also shows that discount rates decline 
as an individual’s YOS increase. 
                     1 Loglinear models restrict the estimated discount rates to positive 
values (Warner and Pleeter 2001, 48). 
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Warner and Pleeter had a unique opportunity to study 
personal discount rates during the DoD-wide force reduction 
that took place between 1992 and 1995.  They evaluated the 
individual discount rates of 11,000 officers and 55,000 
enlisted who chose to leave the military through either the 
VSI or SSB voluntary separations programs.  This study of 
personal discount rates was quite different from previous 
evaluations due to the fact that they were able to use a 
real-life situation in which people made real choices over 
large amounts of real money.  The individual’s choice 
between the two programs made it possible for the authors 
to determine the break-even discount rate that equalized 
the present values of the annuity and lump sum payments, 
which they used in their models to determine coefficients 
that were then used to calculate personal discount rates 
for each person in their data set. 
Warner and Pleeter found that officer personal 
discount rates averaged between 10 and 19 percent, while 
enlisted rates were higher, ranging between 35 to 54 
percent (Warner and Pleeter 2001, 48).  As break-even 
discount rates increased, fewer service personnel opted for 
the SSB payment.  Race was found to have a significant 
positive effect on the option decision, with blacks having 
a higher propensity to take the lump sum payment than other 
nonwhites.  Education levels had a negative influence on 
taking the SSB payment, as the likelihood of choosing the 
one time payment decreased with the more education an 
individual had.  Officer and enlisted members who were in 
combat arms MOS were positively influenced to select the 
lump sum payment as did the year in which the separation 
option was chosen. 
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The authors believe that the SSB separation option was 
welfare enhancing for the government.  This is because the 
services were able to save $1.7 billion through paying lump 
sum payments and not through the more costly annuity 
payments.  The personnel separating also thought they were 
better off with the lump sum payments as well, or they 
would have chosen the VSI option.  Knowing this, it will be 
possible in the future for military planners to create 
monetary policies that are capable of earning the greatest 
return on their investments. 
3. Study by Pat Mackin (1995) 
This study uses the DoD-wide drawdown that occurred 
during the early to mid 1990s to evaluate personal discount 
rates.  Following the Warner and Pleeter techniques, the 
author uses the difference in payment methods of the VSI 
and SSB payments to estimate personal discount rates for 
Air Force personnel.  Mackin evaluated the records of 6,220 
officers and 33,804 enlisted personnel who separated from 
the service, taking either the VSI or SSB, under any of the 
six loss-programs offered by the Air Force. 
The methodology applied to this study follows the 
procedures in the Warner and Pleeter study.  Mackin 
evaluated the economic theory that a person’s discount rate 
is affected by personal characteristics such as age, race, 
sex and education level.  First, a break-even discount rate 
was determined for each individual by solving for D*, which 
makes the two separation payment methods equal in their 
present values.  The author accomplished this using the 
formula: 
 Pr( ) Pr[ *]iSSB x Dβ ε= + >  
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The resulting individual break-even discount rates 
were then added to the data set, and then a probit 
regression was run to predict the probability of an airman 
choosing the SSB over the VSI. 
 1Pr( ) [ * ]iSSB x D
β
σ σ= Φ −  
The following table highlights the results obtained 
from the probit regression analysis: 
 
Table 4.   Results of Probit Analysis 













Constant 6.2179 .2506  24.81*** 2.5276 .1931  13.09***
Wage -.00005 .0000  -9.20*** .00001 .0000   1.57 
Nonwhite .2512 .0233  10.78*** .3237 .0522   6.20***
Female -.1716 .0244  -7.04*** -.0884 .0451  -1.96** 
Marital .1055 .0271   3.90*** .0055 .0465    .12 
NumDep .0285 .0069   4.14*** .0021 .0120    .18 
Prog92 .1886 .0208   9.08*** .1132 .0435   2.60***




*** Significant at the .01 level               (After Mackin 1995, 7) 
**  Significant at the .05 level 
*   Significant at the .10 level 
 
 
The results from the analysis show that the variable, 
wages, had a minimal effect on the choice between taking 
the SSB or VSI programs.  The effect on enlisted was 
significantly negative, but for officers the effect was not 
significant.  The race and gender variables revealed that 
non-whites and males have higher predicted discount rates 
than otherwise similar whites or females.  Discount rates 
were also higher for enlisted personnel who were married 
and for those with dependents.  The year in which the 
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selection decision was made influenced the likelihood of 
both officer and enlisted choosing the SSB, with selection 
rates being significantly higher during 1992, a year in 
which some non-monetary differences existed (Mackin 1995, 
6). 
The results from the model estimating the probability 
of selecting the SSB separation payment enabled the 
calculation of an individual discount rate, for each Air 
Force service member as a function of that individual’s 
personal characteristics.  The predicted personal discount 
rate for each individual was based on the formula used by 
Warner and Pleeter: 
 PDR χβ ε= +  
Table 5 lists the estimated personal discount rates by for 
officers and enlisted personnel based on YOS: 
 
Table 5.   USAF Personal Discount Rates 
 Enlisted Results Officer Results 
YOS 9 .209 .147 
YOS 12 .209 .149 
YOS 15 .205 .155 
YOS 18 .202 .155 
All YOS .209 .146 
(After Mackin 1995, 11) 
 
The estimated personal discount rate for enlisted 
personnel averaged approximately 21 percent, while the 
officer average was lower, around 14 percent.  Personal 
discount rates for enlisted members fell as YOS increased, 
but for officers, the rates increased with YOS.  Personal 
discount rates were found to vary by gender and race. 
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The author indicates some potential policy 
implications from the findings.  Males and non-whites 
appear to be more attracted to current dollars than females 
or whites.  This preference of males and non-whites is 
indicated by the higher discount rates determined for these 
two groups.  This inclination towards current dollars may 
extend into other monetary programs as well, such as 
reenlistment bonuses, retirement, and veteran’s benefits.  
There is also the potential that the Air Force can maximize 
the effect of its special pays through maintaining their 
discount rate at a lower percentage than the rates being 
used by individual airmen.  The author also indicates that 
the findings can potentially provide policy makers with 
indications of how a policy will affect specific 
demographic groups (Mackin 1995, 6). 
The study conducted by Steve Mackin determined the 
individual discount rates of 40,024 Air Force personnel who 
left that service under the VSI or SSB voluntary 
separations programs during 1992 through 1995.  He found 
that officer personal discount rates averaged 14 percent, 
while enlisted rates were higher, averaging 21 percent.  
Wages were found to have little effect on the option 
decision, but gender and race did impact the individual’s 
choice of separation payment option.  The results of this 
study of personal discount rates were consistent with the 
Warner and Pleeter study, although the rates were slightly 
lower and Mackin found an upward rate trend as tenure 
increased, while the opposite was true in the Warner and 
Pleeter study.  Mackin’s evaluation of personal 
characteristics and their effect on individual discount 
rates reveals a potential for DoD planners to create pay 
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policies that are able to maximize the retention effect of 
special pays.  These characteristics can also potentially 
suggest what effects certain types of pay policies will 
have on specific demographic groups of service personnel. 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The three studies under review took advantage of 
changes in DoD policy that enabled them to measure and 
evaluate the rate at which service personnel exchanged 
current dollars for future dollars, or the personal 
discount rate.  The Cylke et al. study evaluated the effect 
of a lump sum bonus payment on reenlistment rates to see if 
receiving current dollars would effect a sailor’s decision 
to reenlist.  The Warner and Pleeter study evaluated the 
choices made by service personnel in choosing the VSI or 
SSB separation payment, again an investigation into the 
exchange of current dollars for future dollars.  The Mackin 
study closely resembled Warner and Pleeter’s, but focused 
only on Air Force personnel and their VSI and SSB choices.  
In all three cases, the methodology was similar.  A 
break-even discount rate was determined for each individual 
by equating the present value of the lump sum bonus or SSB 
payment to the present value of the annuity or VSI payment.  
These individual break-even discount rates were then added 
to each data set, a regression analysis conducted, and the 
estimated coefficients evaluated. 
The resulting coefficients revealed some interesting 
facts.  Race was found to have a significant effect on the 
lump sum or annuity separation option decision.  Blacks 
were found with a higher likelihood to choose the SSB 
payment than other nonwhite personnel.  Gender too, prove a 
significant factor revealing that men were more likely to 
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take the lump sum payment than women were, and their 
personal discount rates were, on average, higher than for 
females.  An individual’s education level was found to have 
a negative influence on choosing the lump sum payment, 
meaning that as a person’s education level increases, his 
or her likelihood to opt for the SSB payment decreases.  
The MOS of the individual impacted the personal discount 
rate as well.  Personnel in combat arms MOS had a higher 
propensity to take the SSB payment.  Wages were found to 
have little impact on an individual’s discount rate 
decision. 
Once the estimated coefficients were evaluated, each 
study determined an individual personal discount rate for 
each service member.  The results of each study proved 
interesting.  Cylke et al. estimated that enlisted sailors 
had, on the margin, a real discount rate of approximately 
17 percent (Cylke et al. 1982, 17).  Warner and Pleeter 
determined a higher personal discount rate for enlisted 
personnel ranging from 35 to 54 percent and a lower rate 
for officers, averaging between 10 to 19 percent (Warner 
and Pleeter 2001, 48).  The Mackin study results were quite 
similar to those of Warner and Pleeter.  Mackin found that 
officer personal discount rates were approximately 14 
percent with enlisted rates of approximately 21 percent. 
Fiscal policy implications were also discussed.  Cylke 
et al. found that their estimated personal discount rate of 
17 percent is higher than the rate used by the Navy, and 
therefore concluded that the lump sum bonus payments were 
more likely to entice a sailor to reenlist than annuity-
type payments would be, and therefore recommended that the 
Navy use lump sum bonus payments for reenlistment purposes. 
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Warner and Pleeter understand the SSB separation 
payment to be cost effective.  The government would be able 
to save considerable amounts of money by using lump sum 
reenlistment or separation payments and by avoiding the 
more costly annuity-type payments.  The authors also 
suggest that it is possible for manpower planners to create 
force-shaping policies that more accurately take into 
account personal discount rates, thereby increasing the 
efficiency of the payment while limiting consumer surplus. 
The Mackin study found that by observing personal 
characteristics and their effects on personal discount rate 
decisions, fiscal planners will be able to get the most out 
of special pay incentives and will be able to determine, 















































III. DATA SET, VARIABLES, AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
A. DATA SET 
The Marine Corps’ Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) 
provided the data set used for this study.  TFDW is the 
Marine Corps’ authorized system of record for current, 
historical, demographic and service-related records.  The 
data contained in TFDW come in quarterly and monthly 
snapshots dating from 1988 to the present (Thomas and Beebe 
2004, 4).  TFDW is used in this study to collect data for 
historical analysis and trend analysis.  It provided the 
specific demographic and service-related information on the 
3,241 Marines who chose to separate using either the VSI or 
SSB voluntary separation payment programs.  The data that 
were extracted from TFDW were pooled.  Groupings were based 
on the year in which the Marine took the separation payment 
option, which included the years 1992 to 1997. 
The data retrieved from TFDW were very complete and 
had very few instances of missing values.  Of the 158,809 
(49 Variables * 3,241 Marines) values obtained, there were 
only 32 missing values.  Thirty-one of these values were in 
the “number of dependents” category, and belonged to 
Marines who were single.  Since these Marines were single, 
the assumption was made that they had no dependents, and 
were therefore assigned a zero under the “number of 
dependents” variable.  The other missing value was a Staff 
Sergeant’s level of education.  Based on the fact that this 
Marine had demonstrated “determination” through getting 




demonstrated the same level of determination in attaining a 
high school diploma, and was therefore assigned that level 
of education. 
The accuracy of the records found for the category 
“educational level” are questionable.  TFDW records show 
that only 85 officers had a degree higher than a high 
school diploma.  Marine Corps policy is for officers to 
have a minimum educational level of a bachelor’s degree 
(Powers 2006, 1).1  Since this policy is in effect, all 
officers were assumed to have the minimum educational level 
of a bachelor’s degree, unless a higher level was recorded 
in TFDW. 
B. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
TFDW provided information on each Marine for 49 
different characteristics.  Table 6 lists these initial 
variables and their definitions. 
 
Table 6.   Initial Variables from TFDW 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
Action Date Year separated from service 
Option Chosen 1 = SSB, 2 = VSI 
Gender 1 = Male, 2 = Female 
Race 1 = White 
2 = Asian 
3 = African American 
4 = Native Hawaiian/Pacific      
Islander 
5 = American Indian/Alaska 
Native 
6 = No response 
Marital Status 1 = Married                      1 Some officers, particularly prior-enlisted officers, do not have a 
bachelor’s degree at time of commissioning.  However, these officers 
are required to earn a bachelor’s degree to remain an officer. 
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2 = Divorced 
3 = Legally Separated 
4 = Annulled 
5 = Single 
6 = Widowed 
Number of Dependents Number of non-spouse dependents 
Present Grade 1 = E4 
2 = E5 
3 = E6 
4 = E7 
5 = O3 
6 = O3E 
7 = O4 
8 = O5 
Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS) 
1 = Combat Arms 
2 = Combat Service Support 
3 = Aviation 
Civilian Education 1 = Less than HS Diploma 
2 = Adult Diploma 
3 = Occupational Cert 
4 = Associated Degree 
5 = GED 
6 = Certification Att 
7 = Correspondence Diploma 
8 = 1 Semester College 
9 = Bachelor’s Degree 
10 = HS Diploma 
11 = Master’s Degree 
12 = Post Masters 
13 = Doctorate 
14 = First Professional 
Date of Birth Date of Birth 
Active Duty Base Date Date Marine came on active duty 
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Additional variables were also created to better 
explain the discount rate decisions being made.  These 
variables are listed below with their definitions. 
 
Table 7.   Created Variables 
Variable Name Variable Definition 
Other Minority Marine has Race = 2, 4, or 5 
Single Marine has Marital Status = 2, 
3, 4, 5 or 6 
Single with Dependents Single Marines who have 
dependents 
Field Grade Marine is an O4 or O5 
Less than HS Diploma Marine has a civilian education 
level = 1 
Equivalent to a HS Diploma Marine has a civilian education 
level = 2, 5, 10 
Greater than HS Diploma Marine has a civilian education 
level = 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 
12, 13, 14 
Unemployment Rate The national unemployment rate 
that corresponds to the month 
in which the Marine separated 
Age at Separation Action Date – Date of Birth 
Years of Service (YOS) Action Date – Active Duty Base 
Date 
Annual Base Pay Annual Base Pay at separation 
Break-Even Discount Rate The rate at which the 
PV(SSB)=PV(VSI) 
 
Three critical variables that had to be created were 
YOS, annual base pay and the break-even discount rate.  YOS 
was determined by subtracting each individual’s active duty 
base date from the date on which he or she took the 
separation payment option.  This produced the total active 
duty time for each Marine who was separating.  The annual 
pay variable was created by taking the rank, YOS and 
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monthly pay for each Marine, as determined from the annual 
pay charts for the years 1992 through 1997, and multiplying 
that by 12.  The break-even discount rate variable was 
formed by determining the rate that equates the present 
value of an annuity formula, where the PV(SSB) = PV(VSI), 
or stated another way, where the PV(lump sum payment) = 
PV(annuity payment). 
C. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
There are 3,241 Marine officers and enlisted men and 
women who separated under either of the two voluntary 
separation payment options that were offered during 1992 to 
1997.  Table 8 shows the demographic and military service 
statistics for the 494 Marine officers who separated during 
this time period. 
 
Table 8.   Descriptive Statistics for Marine Officers 






     
  1992 13 2.63 - 2 15.38 
  1993 268 54.25 - 119 44.40 
  1994 207 41.90 - 66 31.88 
  1995 5 1.01 - 1 20.00 
  1996 1 .002 - 1 100 
Option Chosen      
  SSB 189 38.26 - 189 38.26 
  VSI 305 61.74 - 305 61.74 
Gender      
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  Male 470 95.14 - 181 38.51 
  Female 24 4.86 - 8 33.33 
Race      
  White 460 93.12 - 172 37.39 
  Black 23 4.66 - 10 43.48 
  Am Indian/  
  Alaska 
1 .002 - 0 0 
Marital 
Status 
     
  Married 399 80.77 - 152 38.10 
  Single 95 19.23 - 37 38.95 
Number of 
Dependents 
     
  0 – 3 385 77.94 1.76 146 37.92 
  > 3 109 22.06 4.72 43 39.45 
Rank      
  O3 397 80.37 - 161 40.55 
  O3E 43 8.70 - 16 37.21 
  Field  
  Grade 
54 10.93 - 12 22.22 
MOS      
  Combat  
  Arms 
173 35.02 - 73 42.20 
  Combat    
  Service   
  Support 
167 33.81 - 60 35.93 
  Aviation 154 31.17 - 56 36.36 
Education 
Level 
     
  Bachelors  
  Degree 
411 83.20 - 173 42.09 
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  >  
  Bachelors 
83 16.80 - 16 19.28 
Age      
  27 – 30 48 9.72 29.65 25 52.08 
  31 – 35 332 67.21 33.06 127 38.25 
  36 - 40 105 21.26 37.29 37 35.24 
  41 - 44 9 1.81 41.89 0 0 
YOS      
  4 – 10 224 45.34 8.98 114 50.89 
  11 - 15 234 47.37 11.89 65 27.78 
  16 – 22 36 7.29 17.19 10 27.78 
Unemployment 
Rate 
     
  5.5 – 6.4 209 42.31 5.96 67 32.06 
  6.5 – 7.1 231 46.76 6.86 101 43.72 




     
  6 – 13.99 1 .20 6.88 0 0 
  14 - 14.99 68 13.77 14.70 36 52.94 
  15 – 15.99 155 31.38 15.60 78 50.32 
  16 – 16.99 270 54.66 16.22 75 27.78 
 
Table 9 shows a breakdown of the demographic and 





Table 9.   Descriptive Statistics for Marine Enlisted 






     
  1992 1231 44.81 - 999 81.15 
  1993 1340 48.78 - 1012 75.52 
  1994 175 6.37 - 85 48.57 
  1997 1 .04 - 1 100 
Option 
Chosen 
     
  SSB 2097 76.34 - 2097 76.34 
  VSI 650 23.66 - 650 23.66 
Gender      
  Male 2599 94.61 - 1993 76.68 
  Female 148 5.39 - 104 70.27 
Race      
  White 2012 73.24 - 1510 75.05 
  Black 594 21.62 - 474 79.80 
  Other  
  Minority 
9 .33 - 8 88.89 
Marital 
Status 
     
  Married 2240 81.54 - 1713 76.47 
  Single 507 18.64 - 384 75.74 
Number of 
Dependents 
     
  0 – 3 2115 76.99 1.85 1629 77.02 
  > 3 632 23.01 4.51 468 74.05 
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Rank      
  E4 115 4.19 - 103 89.57 
  E5 1268 46.16 - 1057 83.36 
  E6 1175 42.77 - 810 68.94 
  E7 189 6.88 - 127 67.20 
MOS      
  Combat  
  Arms 
405 14.74 - 318 78.52 
  Combat    
  Service   
  Support 
1303 47.43 - 974 74.75 
  Aviation 1039 37.82 - 805 77.48 
Education 
Level 
     
  Less than  
  HS Diploma 
14 .51 - 10 71.43 
  HS Diploma 
  Equivalent 
274 9.97 - 200 72.99 
  Greater  
  than HS  
  Diploma 
2459 89.52 - 1887 76.74 
Age      
  22 – 30 989 36.02 28.51 855 86.45 
  31 – 35 1303 47.43 32.91 958 73.52 
  36 - 40 394 14.34 37.28 245 62.18 
  41 - 46 61 2.21 42.39 39 63.93 
YOS      
  4 – 10 599 21.81 8.58 541 90.32 
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  11 - 15 1671 60.83 12.66 1264 75.64 
  16 – 21 477 17.36 16.80 292 61.22 
Unemployment 
Rate 
     
  5.2 – 6.5 204 7.43 6.47 132 64.71 
  6.6 – 7.3 1600 58.25 7.10 1179 73.69 




     
  6 – 10.99 2 .07 8.72 1 50.00 
  11 – 14.99 270 9.83 14.22 252 93.33 
  15 – 15.99 327 11.90 15.65 288 88.07 
  16 – 16.99 2148 78.20 16.33 1556 72.44 
 
2. Preliminary Findings 
A preliminary evaluation reveals interesting facts 
about the Marines in the data set and the rate at which 
they chose the SSB voluntary separation payment option.  
Marine officers chose the lump sum payment 38 percent of 
the time while enlisted Marines were twice as likely to 
take the SSB option, selecting it at a rate of 76 percent.  
For both officers and enlisted, men had a higher percentage 
of individuals choosing the SSB payment than women did, 
although the differences in selection rates were relatively 
small, the differences between genders being 5.18 percent 
for officers and 6.41 percent for enlisted Marines.  
African-American officers and enlisted Marines, had a 
higher percentage of individuals who selected the lump sum 
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payment than whites did, but a rate not as high as seen in 
Marines of other minority groups. 
Marital status information highlighted some 
differences between those Marines who are married and those 
who are not.  Single officers chose the lump sum payment 
.85 percent more frequently than did married officers, but 
this trend was reversed for the enlisted Marines where 
those who were married had a .73 percent higher percent 
rate for choosing the SSB payment option.  Overall, 
enlisted Marines, both married and single, were 
approximately twice as likely to choose the lump sum option 
when compared to married and single officers.  The number 
of dependents had a positive effect on officers, meaning 
that as the number of dependents increased, a higher 
percentage of officers took the SSB payment.  The opposite 
effect was seen in the enlisted data.  Here, as the number 
of dependents increased, the less frequently an enlisted 
Marine opted to take the lump sum payment option. 
Differences in the percentages of SSB takers can also 
be seen in the rank and MOS data.  The data from these 
categories show that, as Marines increased in rank, the 
percentage of those who took the lump sum payment 
decreased.  This was true for both officers and enlisted 
Marines.   Marines who have combat arms MOS had the highest 
percentage of SSB choosers - 42.20 for officers, and 78.52 
for enlisted.  Aviation MOS Marines were next with 
percentages of takers at 36.36 for officers and 77.48 for 
enlisted.  Marines in combat service support MOS had the 
lowest percentage of men and women who took the SSB 
payment, 35.93 among officers, and 74.75 percent among 
enlisted. 
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Education data reveal different behavior for officers 
and enlisted Marines.  For officers, as their educational 
levels increased beyond that of a bachelor’s degree, fewer 
officers chose the lump sum payment option.  Officers with 
just a bachelor’s degree had a 42.09 percent SSB selection 
rate, while officers with more education had a 19.28 
percent SSB take rate.  Education had the opposite effect 
on the enlisted Marines.  As educational levels increased, 
a higher percentage of Marines selected the SSB payment.  
Enlisted Marines with a high school diploma took the SSB 
payment 1.56 percent more frequently than those without a 
high school diploma.  Marines who had educational levels 
above that of a high school diploma were 3.75 percent more 
likely to take the SSB than those individuals with just a 
high school diploma. 
The data on age show that, for officers, the 
percentage of those who took the SSB payment decreases as 
age increases.  Over half of the officers in the 27 to 30 
year- old category chose the lump sum payment.  The 
percentage of takers drops to 38.25 for the 31 to 35 year-
old officers and falls further to 35.24 for those officers 
between 36 and 40.  There were no officers in the 41 to 44 
year-old range that selected the SSB payment over the VSI 
payment option.  This age effect was generally found among 
enlisted Marines as well.  The youngest group of enlisted 
Marines, 22 to 30 years of age, had a high rate of SSB 
takers, 86.45 percent.  The next age range of enlisted 
Marines, 31 to 35, took the SSB payment 73.52 percent of 
the time.  Those Marines in the 36 to 40 year-old group had 
the lowest percentage of takers, at 62.18 percent.  This  
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was 1.75 percent less than the percentage of SSB takers for 
the oldest group of enlisted Marines who ranged in age from 
41 to 46 years old. 
As YOS increased for officers and enlisted alike, 
there was a decreasing percentage of those who were willing 
to take the lump sum payment.  Those officers with 4 to 10 
YOS selected the SSB 50.89 percent of the time, while 
enlisted Marines in the same YOS group had a very high lump 
sum selection rate, 90.32 percent.  The SSB selection rate 
dropped to 27.78 percent for officers in the 11 to 15 and 
16 to 22 YOS groups, while enlisted Marines in these two 
YOS ranges had higher SSB selection rates of 75.64 and 
61.22 respectively. 
Unemployment rate figures show an increase in the 
percentage of SSB choosers as the unemployment rate 
increased.  When unemployment rates were low in the 5.2 to 
6.5 percent range, 32.06 percent of officers and 64.71 
percent of enlisted Marines chose the SSB payment.  The 
selection rates increased to 43.72 for officers and 73.69 
for enlisted as unemployment rates increased from 6.5 to 
7.3 percent.  In the highest unemployment rate level, 7.4 
to 7.8 percent, more enlisted Marines took the SSB payment, 
83.35 percent; however fewer officers who separated during 
a period with these higher rates took the lump sum payment 
option, only 38.89 percent. 
The percentage of enlisted Marines who take the SSB 
payment decreases as their break-even discount rates 
increase.  Marines with BEDR rates ranging from 12 to 14.99 
percent have a high 93.33 percent SSB selection rate, while 
those with BEDR between 15 and 15.99 percent select the 
lump sum payment 88.07 percent of the time.  Enlisted 
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personnel with BEDR ranging from 16 to 16.99 percent have 
the lowest lump sum payment selection rate of 72.44 
percent.  Marine officer data do not reveal quite the same 
pattern, although it is similar.  Officers in the 14 to 
14.99 BEDR group have a 52.94 percent SSB selection rate.  
Those officers in the next higher range of BEDR have a lump 
sum selection rate of 50.32.  The last group of officers 
has BEDR in the 16 to 16.99 percent range, and these 
Marines have a 27.78 percent SSB selection rate. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Total Force Data Warehouse provided the 
demographic and service-related information on the 3,241 
Marines who chose to separate from the service through the 
VSI and SSB voluntary separation payment programs during 
the years 1992 to 1997.  The TFDW data set was very 
complete, having only 32 values of information missing.  
The values for these absent data were logically estimated.  
While the data set was complete, the accuracy of the 
variable describing each Marine’s level of education 
appeared to be inaccurate.  This problem was overcome by 
making the assumption that all officers have a bachelor’s 
degree as their minimum level of education, based on Marine 
Corps policy for officer education requirements. 
TFDW provided 49 different categories of information 
on each Marine that were converted into the variables that 
are used in the study.  YOS, annual base pay and the break-
even discount rate were three variables that had to be 
created and added to the data set before analysis could be 
done.  YOS and annual base pay calculations were used to 
determine the break-even discount rate, which is the key 
variable that was not in the TFDW data.  The break-even 
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discount rate variable represents the rate that makes the 
present value of an annuity equal to the present value of 
the lump sum payment. 
The descriptive statistics addressing the personal 
aspects of the 494 officers and 2,747 enlisted Marines who 
separated under either the VSI or SSB voluntary separation 
payment options during 1992 to 1997 reveal SSB selection 
patterns that are worthy of notice.  First, male Marines 
were more frequent takers of the lump sum payment than were 
women Marines.  Second, when looking at race, Marines who 
are members of a minority group other than blacks, had the 
highest SSB selection rate.  African-American Marines had 
the second highest selection rate, while white Marines had 
the lowest percentage of SSB option takers.  Marital status 
data show that single officers chose the lump sum option 
more often than did married officers, but for enlisted 
Marines those who were married had the higher SSB 
participation rates than those enlisted who were single.  
Both married and single enlisted Marines chose the SSB 
payment almost twice as often as their officer 
counterparts.  When the number of dependents was 
considered, the data reveal that fewer officers took the 
lump sum payment as the number of dependents increased.  
The opposite was true for enlisted Marines.  Age too, 
affects the number of SSB takers in that as officers age, 
they less frequently select the lump sum separation 
payment.  Enlisted Marines generally follow this age 
pattern as well, with a minor variation in the 31 to 35 age 
bracket where their selection frequency was 1.75 percent 
lower than the oldest group of enlisted Marines. 
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The statistics that describe the professional 
characteristics of the separating Marines also show lump 
sum selection patterns that are interesting.  First, 
enlisted Marines took the SSB payment twice as often as the 
officers did.  Rank and MOS statistics point to the fact 
that officers and enlisted Marines chose the SSB option 
less frequently as they rise in rank, and that those 
Marines with combat arms MOS take the lump sum payment more 
frequently than those in combat service support or aviation 
MOS.  Officers and enlisted Marines took the SSB payment at 
a decreasing rate as their years of service increased.  
Educational data point to a difference between officers and 
enlisted.  As an officer’s education level increases beyond 
a bachelor’s degree, he or she less frequently selects the 
lump sum payment option.  Enlisted Marines show the 
opposite tendency.  As their education levels increase 
above a high school diploma, their SSB selection 
percentages increase.  Evaluation of the Marines’ break-
even discount rates shows that the percentage of enlisted 
Marines who choose the lump sum payment decreases as the 
break-even discount rates increase.  Marine officers have a 
similar tendency, but officers in the middle range of BEDR 
have the lowest SSB selection rate, .24 percent lower than 
the group of officers who have the highest BEDR range. 
External factors also seemed to influence the Marines’ 
payment option decisions.  The descriptive statistics show 
that as the unemployment rate that separating Marines faced 
increased, the percentage of SSB choosers increased.  When 
unemployment rates were low, fewer officers and enlisted 
Marines chose the SSB payment, but correspondingly, as 
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those rates went up so did the number of Marines who opted 
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
A. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this study is two-fold.  The first 
goal is to determine the personal discount rate for each 
Marine who left the Marine Corps under either the VSI or 
the SSB voluntary separation payment programs between 1992 
and 1997.  These data will reveal the discount rate at 
which present dollars were exchanged for future dollars.  
This research also determines and evaluates the personal, 
professional, and economic factors that had a significant 
effect on the Marines in their personal discount rate 
decisions. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The break-even discount rate for each Marine was 
calculated using the following method outlined by Warner 
and Pleeter (2001, 45): 
• Obtain data from TFDW on those Marines who separated 
from active duty service under the VSI and SSB 
programs.  
• Calculate the monetary value of the SSB and VSI 
options for each individual based on their base pay 
and YOS. 
• Determine the present value of the SSB payment 
through the formula: ( )15%* *BasePay YOS . 
• Determine the present value of the VSI payment 
through the formula: ( ) ( )2.5%* * * 2*BasePay YOS YOS . 
• Calculate the break-even discount rate for each 





• Include these break-even discount rates as an 
explanatory variable in a regression to estimate the 
probability of each individual selecting the SSB 
payment option. 
• Run a regression to determine the parameter 
estimates for the independent variables in the 
model. 
• Calculate sigma for the model using this formula:  
 
• Calculate beta for each independent variable using 
this formula:  
 
• Predict each individual’s personal discount rate 
using the formula: 
 
C. THEORETICAL MODELS 
1. Population Model 
The probability of choosing the SSB option is expected 
to be a function of gender, race, marital status, number of 
dependents, present grade, MOS, civilian education level, 
year in which separated, YOS, age at separation, base pay, 
and personal discount rate.  The population model is 
represented by:  
0 1 1 2 2 3 3Pr( ) ... k kSSB β β χ β χ β χ β χ ε= + + + +  
2. Empirical Model 
Given the specific variables in the data set, the 
empirical model to be estimated is: 
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3. Hypothesized Relationships 
Over the past 20 years, economists have attempted to 
determine personal discount rates and identify the personal 
and professional characteristics that influence those 
rates.  The following table lists the variables that are 
thought to have an effect on an individual’s likelihood to 
select the lump sum voluntary separation option, and the 
direction of the effect that is anticipated. 
 
Table 10.   Variables and Hypothesized Effects 
Variable Type of Effect on Pr(SSB) 
Separation Year Negative 
Gender Positive for Males 
Negative for Females 
Race Positive for minorities 
Negative for non-minorities 
Marital Status Unknown 
Number of Dependents Positive 
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Rank Negative 
MOS Positive for Combat Arms 
Negative for Combat Service 
Support and Aviation MOS 
Education Level Negative 
Age Negative 
YOS Negative 
Unemployment Rate Positive 
Break-Even Discount Rate Negative 
 
The year in which a Marine made the separation payment 
decision is expected to have a significant effect on an 
individual’s option decision and ultimately their personal 
discount rate.  It is estimated that as the time increases 
from the original start date of these programs, there will 
be a decrease in a Marine’s propensity to choose the SSB 
program.  The first year in which these two programs were 
offered, 1992, the VSI option required a longer reserve 
commitment and had none of the transitional benefits that 
were included with the SSB option, such as commissary and 
exchange privileges, medical coverage and shipment of 
household goods.  These features acted as deterrents to 
Marines selecting the VSI program and highly encouraged 
them to opt for the SSB separation payment, which entitled 
them to much greater intrinsic and psychological benefits.  
This encouragement to select the lump sum payment motivated 
Marines to use high discount rates because they would want 
larger amounts of money in the future in order to give up 
the benefits offered now by the SSB option.  The negative 
effect on the separation option decision that resulted from 
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the way in which this policy was written was recognized, 
and the unequal aspects of the two programs were corrected 
in the FY 1993 Defense Authorization Act.  From 1993 
onward, the SSB and VSI choices were both based only on the 
financial characteristics of the two options (Warner and 
Pleeter 2001, 36). 
Previous studies have produced varied results on the 
effect of gender on an individual’s separation option 
decision and accordingly, his or her personal discount 
rate.  Warner and Pleeter found that men have higher 
probabilities of taking the lump sum payment, while Gilman 
found that women had higher discount rates (Gilman 1976, B-
3).  This study anticipates that male Marines are more 
likely to have the higher discount rates.  It is believed 
that men can discount future income at a higher rate 
because their earnings in the civilian job market will be 
higher than that of women (Ehrenberg and Smith 2003, 380).  
Male Marines leaving the service could expect to earn more 
in their civilian employment, so they could better afford 
to take the lower amount of money offered by the lump sum 
payment option. 
Economic theory suggests that younger individuals 
should discount income at a higher rate than older people 
do because they have a longer anticipated time in which to 
earn money (Mankiw 2004, 435).  The average age for the 
male Marines in the data set is lower than it is for the 
female Marines.  The average age for male officers is 32 
years old, while female officers are, on average three 
years older.  The same pattern is seen in the enlisted 
Marines, but there is not as large an age gap between the 
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two genders.  Marine enlisted males average 32 years old, 
while female enlisted Marines are on average 33 years old. 
Race is expected to have a significant effect on a 
Marine’s personal discount rate and his or her separation 
program decision.  It is anticipated that minority Marines 
would be more positively influenced to select the SSB 
payment than non-minority Marines, indicating a higher 
personal discount rate.  Warner and Pleeter (2001, 37) 
suggest that these effects are to be expected because those 
Marines who are better educated and at higher income levels 
may be able to borrow money at lower rates than minority 
personnel who are not as educated or as financially well-
off.  They go on to suggest that discrimination could also 
be an influencing factor on a minority member’s personal 
discount rate.  The influence would be in proportion to the 
amount of discrimination faced in the credit markets.  
Marines who are members of a minority will face higher 
borrowing rates and therefore would have higher personal 
discount rates to compensate for that discrimination. 
The impact of marital status on a Marine’s personal 
discount rate is unknown.  At first thought, it could be 
anticipated that a married individual would value larger 
payments over time because of his or her need to take care 
of a spouse and the other responsibilities that are 
associated with being married.  Economic theory would seem 
to support this view as an individual would want to 
maximize his or her utility; so therefore, married Marines 
should be less likely to select the SSB option because it 
would give them less money.  In other words, the 
opportunity cost would be too great for them to accept the 
lower amount of money (Mankiw 2004, 6).  Their increased 
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responsibilities for family members would encourage them to 
focus on long range choices and benefits instead of short 
range benefits.  A married person may however prefer a lump 
sum payment because that would give him or her a sizeable 
amount money in the present, which would enable him or her 
to better provide a spouse’s needs now.   
The number of dependents in a Marine’s family is 
anticipated to have a positive effect on personal discount 
rates.  It is also expected that as the number of 
dependents increases, the more likely a Marine will be to 
select the lump sum payment option.  These effects are 
anticipated because those Marines with larger families have 
more financial obligations during the transition to 
civilian life, and this should encourage them to select the 
SSB option.  This program would provide monetary benefits 
in the present, which these Marines could use as they seek 
new employment, support their families, and look to 
establish themselves in a new lifestyle. 
It is anticipated that as a Marine’s rank increases, 
it will have a negative influence on his or her decision to 
select the SSB payment option, and hence it would have a 
negative effect on that individual’s personal discount 
rate.  Junior enlisted Marines would be expected to have 
the highest SSB selection rate due to their lower level of 
education and experience.  They would not be expected to 
fully understand the monetary differences between the two 
options, and therefore not be able to make as good a 
decision as to which option was the best (Mankiw 2004, 5).  
The more senior enlisted Marines and officers, it is 
believed, would be less likely to take the SSB payment 
because these individuals are better educated, more mature 
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and would be more inclined to wait for larger returns.  
They would also be better educated on the benefits of 
patience and therefore be more willing to wait for future 
benefits. 
It is expected that Marines serving in combat arms MOS 
would have a higher propensity to select the lump sum 
payment than those Marines serving in combat service 
support and aviation MOS, and to have a higher personal 
discount rate.  This result is anticipated because these 
Marines face a higher probability of suffering bodily harm 
due to the nature of their MOS.  This should encourage them 
to enjoy their rewards now, rather than postpone their 
benefits to a future time, which might not come.  Marine 
officers in combat arms MOS are also, on average, younger 
than those serving in combat service support and aviation 
MOS, again leading to a higher likelihood of selecting the 
SSB payment due to their younger age and lower levels of 
education.  Since combat service support and aviation 
Marines do not experience the same level of imminent 
danger, and are generally better educated, it is expected 
that they would more fully comprehend the benefits that 
come from selecting the annuity option, which should 
decrease their likelihood of selecting the SSB. 
As the level of a Marine’s education increases, the 
probability of selecting the SSB payment should fall.  As a 
Marine becomes more educated, he or she would be better 
able to understand the monetary benefits associated with 
the annuity option when compared to the lump sum payment.  
Marines with higher education would be able to understand 
that there is a higher payoff from taking the VSI option, 
despite their having to wait longer to receive that 
51 
benefit.  Additional evidence to support this theory comes 
from the studies done by Gilman and Black who found that 
personal discount rates decrease with education (Warner and 
Pleeter 2001, 37) 
As a Marine’s age increases, the likelihood of that 
individual taking the SSB payment is expected to decrease, 
which in turn lowers his or her personal discount rate.  It 
is believed that older Marines would be more educated and 
better able to understand the benefits of the two different 
payment plans, and then use that knowledge to make the most 
personally-beneficial choice, which would be to accept the 
VSI option.  Older Marines are also expected to place more 
value on future benefits than present benefits.  According 
to the Gilman study, the life cycle consumption theory 
suggests that younger people would be more likely to select 
current income over future money than older people (Gilman 
1976, 29).  The implication is also that younger 
individuals would have higher personal discount rates. 
The number of years a Marine has served on active duty 
is expected to significantly affect his or her separation 
payment option decision.  It is believed that the Marines 
with higher YOS would be more likely to select the VSI 
payment option because they would receive higher monetary 
values through that program.  Being older and more educated 
should help them to see that the VSI program would give 
them more money than the SSB program would.  They are also 
expected to be more future oriented and therefore value 
long-term investments more than short-term ones.  Marines 
with lower YOS would be expected to prefer the lump sum 
payment because they are younger (Gilman 1976, 28), less 
well educated and not as able to fully understand the two 
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programs, and are therefore more likely to make a poor 
decision about which option to take (Mankiw 2004, 6). 
The higher the unemployment rate that a Marine will 
face upon separation from the military, the more positive 
is the influence that is anticipated on that Marine’s 
decision to select the SSB payment option.  This is 
believed because, as unemployment rates increase, it is 
harder for the individual to find a job, thereby 
encouraging that person to select the payment option that 
will provide him or her with current money.  They can then 
use these funds to support themselves during the time in 
which they are searching for civilian employment. 
Economic theory suggests that Marines will make their 
voluntary separation payment option decision by comparing 
the present value of the VSI option with that of the SSB 
option (Goldberg 2001, 67).  The break-even discount rate 
is that rate which equates the present value of the lump 
sum payment with the present value of the annuity payment: 
( ) P ( )PV LumpSum V Annuity=  
or 
( )1 1( ) P ( ) * 1 tPV LumpSum V Annuity C r
r r
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤= = − +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭  
As a Marine’s break-even discount rate increases, it 
is expected to have a negative effect on that individual’s 
personal discount rate.  This would also imply that, as the 
break-even discount rate goes up, the likelihood of 
choosing the SSB option goes down.  In Goldberg’s 
evaluation of the Warner and Pleeter study, the author 
concludes that individuals will choose the SSB payment 
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option only if their personal discount rate is larger than 
their break-even discount rate (Goldberg 2001, 75).   
D. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
1. Types of Models 
The preliminary findings and descriptive statistics 
indicated that for this data set, it might be prudent to 
segregate the Marines into officers and enlisted.  A 
restricted model test confirmed that the coefficients for 
these two groups were in fact significantly different from 
each other (.01 significance level), and should therefore 
be evaluated in separate models1. 
2. Model Forms 
For this study, logit and probit models were chosen 
instead of linear probability models for several reasons.  
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the probability of 
a Marine selecting the SSB payment option.  There are only 
two options, the Marine selects the SSB or does not select 
the SSB.  The results of these decisions are best expressed 
in terms of a binary response.  A negative predicted 
probability can be obtained through a linear probability 
model, and is not appropriate here.  Probit and logit 
models also solve the problem of heteroskedasticity by 
using the maximum likelihood estimation (Wooldridge 2003, 
557). 
A probit model was used for the officer data because 
the officer data appears to conform better to a probit 
distribution than it does to a logit model’s distribution.  
Conversely, the enlisted data had a distribution that 
better fit a logit model’s distribution. 
                     1 -2 Log L of the unrestricted model was 3523.919, and the -2 Log L 
of the restricted officer model was.616.061, and the restricted 
enlisted model was 2790.776 
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3. Potential Problems 
Selection bias is a potential problem in the models.  
This is because the only Marines included in the data set 
are those who made the decision to separate from the Marine 
Corps.  The data does not include those Marines who were 
eligible for the VSI and SSB programs, but chose to remain 
on active duty.  There is not a comparison between those 
who were eligible and chose to leave, and those who were 
eligible and chose to stay.  This bias could inflate, or 
overstate, the personal discount rates because only those 
Marines with high personal discount rates would be observed 
in the data set.  Individuals who have lower discount rates 
are not observed in the data set because they remained in 
the Marines. 
A second potential problem in the models is that of 
omitted variable bias.  Omitted variables can lead to under 
specifying the models.  Omitted variables can bias the 
other variables in the models because, not only do they 
affect the dependent variable, but they can also affect the 
other independent variables.  Omitted variables can cause 
the coefficients of the independent variables to be biased 
and thereby making the models less accurate.  If the 
omitted variables could be included, it would diminish the 
variable bias, but it would increase the variance; however 
the accuracy of the parameter estimates would be improved.  
Specifically for these models, there is no variable in the 
models that accounts for the potential civilian earnings of 
the Marines who separated.  It is not known what an 
individual is expected to make in a civilian job, and 
therefore his or her “cost of leaving” cannot be accurately 
estimated and taken into account.  The resulting bias can 
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produce values that are higher than they should be since 
the negative cost of leaving the military has not been 
properly accounted for in the models.  A solution would be 
finding a suitable proxy variable for the anticipated 
civilian earnings variable, but the TFDW data did not offer 
a suitable alternative variable (Wooldridge 2003, 485). 
The potential for downward bias also exists because 
the models only use the money received from taking the VSI 
or SSB payment option.  They do not consider the total 
compensation received from taking one option over the 
other.  Psychic and implicit benefits are difficult to 
measure as well, which can increase bias due to the fact 
that the total benefits cannot be determined and then 
monetized for comparison purposes (Boardman, et al. 2001, 
40). 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The aims of this study are to determine the rates at 
which Marines who separated from the Marine Corps under the 
VSI or the SSB voluntary separation payment programs 
exchanged present dollars for future dollars and to 
establish and assess the personal, professional, and 
economic factors that significantly affected the personal 
discount rate decisions. 
Using Warner and Pleeter as a guide, this study 
determined the break-even discount rate for each separating 
Marine by finding the rate that set the present value of 
the lump sum payment equal to present value of the annuity 
payment.  These break-even discount rates were then used as 
an independent variable in a regression to predict the 
probability of each Marine selecting the SSB payment plan.  
The resulting model coefficients were each multiplied by 
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the value of one divided by the BEDR coefficient, with the 
results being used to estimate each Marine’s personal 
discount rate. 
The likelihood to select the SSB option is a function 
of a Marine’s personal and professional traits, as well as 
external economic factors.  Male Marines, black Marines and 
Marines with dependents are expected to have a higher 
probability of taking the lump sum payment than female 
Marines, non-minority Marines and those individuals without 
dependents.  These personal traits are anticipated to 
produce positive and significant effects on the decision 
about which separation option to choose.  Marines with 
these traits are expected to need current dollars to 
support his or her transition to civilian life, and would 
therefore be more likely to take the SSB payment plan.  
Education, age, and personal discount rate are 
characteristics that are expected to negatively influence 
the Marine’s payment option decision.  As the first two 
variables increase in number, there is a corresponding 
increase in a Marine’s ability to understand the monetary 
benefits that come from selecting the VSI plan, and this 
should enable them to make a better decision, which in this 
instance is to select the annuity payment because it proves 
a larger amount of money.  The break-even discount rate 
should negatively affect the likelihood of choosing the SSB 
option because individuals will choose the SSB payment 
option only if their personal discount rate is larger than 
their break-even discount rate.  The effect that marital 
status will have on the separation payment option decision 
is unknown, because while a married Marine may value the 
larger payments associated with the VSI plan, he or she may 
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opt for the SSB payment since it provides current income 
that can be used to provide for the needs of a spouse 
during the time of transition between professions. 
MOS is the only professional trait that is anticipated 
to have a positive effect on a Marine selecting the lump 
sum payment plan.  Marines who are in combat arms MOS 
should have a higher propensity to select the lump sum 
payment and to have a higher personal discount rate, than 
non-combat arms Marines.  This is expected because combat 
arms Marines are, on average, less educated and younger 
than Marines in other MOS, which makes comprehending the 
benefits resulting from the VSI payment more difficult.  
Not fully understanding the payment options would increase 
the probability of combat arms Marines making poorer 
choices, which would be choosing the SSB plan. 
Separation year, rank and YOS are all anticipated to 
have negative effects on the SSB payment option being 
selected.  The policy differences that existed in 1992 
encouraged Marines to select the lump sum payment, but when 
the programs were changed in 1993, monetary characteristics 
became the most important factor in the option decision.  
Therefore, as time increased there is a lesser propensity 
to choose the SSB payment since it provides fewer benefits 
when compared to those provided by the VSI plan.  Rank and 
YOS are anticipated to have negative effects because as 
Marines become more senior, their ability to more fully 
understand the monetary differences between the two 
programs increases, which gives he or she a better 
understanding of finances and a higher probability of 
selecting the VSI payment since that plan produces more 
return on the investment. 
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The unemployment rate is an external characteristic 
that will likely have a positive influence on a Marine’s 
decision to select the SSB payment plan.  As unemployment 
rates increase, the more difficult it will be for the 
Marine to find a job.  This knowledge should then encourage 
that individual to take the current money that the SSB 
program offers, so that these funds can be used as 
financial support during the time of transition to civilian 
employment. 
The Marines in the data set were separated into 
officer and enlisted categories because the parameter 
estimates for these two groups were significantly different 
to warrant such segregation.  Logit and probit models were 
chosen because the results of the separation payment option 
decisions are best expressed as binary responses.  Marine 
officer data had a distribution that better fit a probit 
distribution, while the enlisted data appears to conform 
better to a logit distribution. 
There are three areas of potential bias in this study.  
Selection bias could exist because there is a lack of 
comparison between those who were eligible and chose to 
leave, and those who were eligible and chose to stay.  
Personal discount rates could be overstated because only 
those Marines with high personal discount rates would be 
observed in the data.  Individuals with lower discount 
rates are not seen because they remained in the Marines.  
Omitted variable bias could lead to lower personal discount 
rate values because an accurate “cost of leaving” cannot be 
determined since the civilian earnings that the Marine 
expected to be paid after separation cannot be estimated 
precisely.  Upward bias may raise the predicted personal 
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discount rates because the models use only the monetary 
values received from taking the VSI or SSB payment option.  
Total compensation received from choosing one plan over the 
other is not considered, nor are the psychic and implicit 
benefits addressed since they are difficult to measure and 
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V. RESULTS OF MULTIVARIATE MODELS 
A. OFFICER ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table 11 displays the estimation results for Marine 
officers: 
 









Intercept -3.3960 2.8221 0.2288 -0.0000 
SEP_1992 -0.8386 0.5201 0.10693 -0.2424 
SEP_1994 0.3361 0.2898 0.2461 0.1613 
SEP_1995 0.1507 0.7602 0.8428 0.1008 
FEMALE -0.0665 0.3044 0.8272 -0.0179 
BLK 0.1627 0.2844 0.5672 0.0684 
SINGLE 0.1270 0.2053 0.5364 -0.0684 
NUMBER_DEPENDENTS 0.0544 0.0475 0.2515 0.0221 
O3E 0.1809 0.2586 0.4841 0.0667 
FIELD_GRADE 0.000386 0.2877 0.9989 0.0116 
COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT -0.0785 0.1507 0.6024 -0.0319 
AVIATION -0.1065 0.1481 0.4721 -0.0371 
GRADUATE_EDUCATION -0.5751 0.1812 0.00151 -0.1895 
UNEMPLOYMENT_RATE 0.6165 0.2840 0.02992 0.2721 
AGE -0.00170 0.0362 0.9625 -0.0004 
YOS -0.0707 0.0584 0.2257 -0.0296 
BEDR -1.5549 14.1831 0.9127 0.0029 
SINGLE_WITH_DEPENDENTS -0.1283 0.0906 0.15663 -0.2439 
R-Squared 0.0859    
Max-rescaled R-Squared 0.1168    
Number of Observations 494    
1 Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
2 Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. 
3 Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level, one-tail test. 
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The partial effects1 results reveal that those officers 
who separated from the Marine Corps during the year 1992 
had a .2424 lower likelihood of selecting the SSB payment 
option when compared to those officers who left in 1993, 
the base year.  Officers who made the separation payment 
decision during 1992 were also .4037 and .3432 less likely 
to choose the SSB payment than those officers separating in 
1994 and 1995, respectively2.  While the effect of 
separating in 1992 on the officer’s decision to select the 
lump sum payment option was negative, it was only slightly 
significant at the 0.10 level for a one-tail test (0.0534), 
ceteris paribus.  These results were not anticipated.  It 
was thought that since the intrinsic and psychological 
advantages to selecting the SSB plan were neutralized after 
1992, there would be a higher propensity to choose the VSI 
payment in later years because the annuity option offered a 
greater amount of money to the separating officer.  The 
results indicate that as time progressed, Marine officers 
continued to discount future money at a high discount rate, 
indicating their preference for current dollars over future 
dollars.  For those separating officers, their need for 
current dollars appears to outweigh the value they place on 
future benefits.  The decisions being made here do not 
support economic theory in terms of maximizing utility; but 
it may be that, to those officers who were separating, 
maximum utility was defined as having current money to 
facilitate their transition from the military to a civilian 
profession.  Their opportunity cost of not having current 
dollars was too great for them to trade for future money. 
                     1 Partial effects were calculated by determining the effect of a change in a single variable of the base case officer on the Pr(SSB). 
2 .4037 = 0.1613-(-.2424) and .3432 = 0.1008-(-.2424), respectively. 
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Graduate education had a highly significant negative 
effect on a Marine officer’s probability of selecting the 
lump sum payment option.  The partial effects of a graduate 
education show that officers with a level of education 
greater than a bachelor’s degree were .1895 less likely to 
choose the SSB payment plan.  This graduate education 
coefficient was highly significant at all usual levels 
(0.0015), ceteris paribus.  These results were anticipated, 
because as officers become more educated, they are better 
able to understand fiscal programs and to recognize that an 
annuity-type payment offers them greater monetary value 
than a lump sum payment would.  Out of 83 officers who had 
educational levels higher than a bachelor’s degree, 67 of 
them, or 80.7 percent, decided to take the VSI payment.  
This high percentage of officers selecting the VSI payment 
option indicates that those officers with a greater 
educational level applied the added wisdom, gained from a 
higher level of education, to their present value decision 
making process, which led them to choose the VSI option 
since it gives them the greatest utility. 
The unemployment rate faced by Marine officers at 
their time of separation had a significantly positive 
effect on their decision to choose the lump sum payment 
option.  The partial effects of the unemployment rate 
reveal that, as the rate of unemployment increased by 0.1 
percent, the officers were .2721 more likely to take the 
SSB payment than officers who faced the average 
unemployment rate of 6.5 percent.  The unemployment rate 
estimate was significant at the 0.05 level (0.0299), 
ceteris paribus.  These results were expected.  The data 
show that 81 out of the 152 officers, who faced a higher 
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than average unemployment rate upon separation from the 
Marine Corps, selected the lump sum payment option.  This 
indicates that 53.3 percent of the officers who would have 
a more difficult time locating civilian employment chose 
the separation payment option that provided them with 
current dollars, which could them be used during the time 
they were temporarily unemployed. 
The interaction term that evaluates the effect of the 
number of dependents on a single officer’s decision to 
select the SSB payment option shows that the effect of 
another dependent on a single Marine is different from the 
effect of another dependent on a married Marine.  Those 
single officers who added one more dependent were 0.2439 
less likely to choose the lump sum payment than were 
married officers who added one more dependent.  While the 
effect of one more dependent on single officers was 
negative, it was minimally so at the 0.10 level for a one-
tail test (0.0783), ceteris paribus.  These results were 
not anticipated.  The preliminary data led to the belief 
that those Marines with more dependents would be more 
likely to take the current dollars to aid them in their 
transition out of the service and this was true for married 
Marines.  The results of the model show however that single 
Marines became less likely to take the lump sum payment as 
their number of dependents increased by one.  It appears 
that as the responsibility for additional dependents 
increased for single Marines, they valued the larger 
amounts of money offered by the VSI program, even though 




The opportunity cost brought about by a larger family was 
too great for single Marines to accept the SSB payment with 
its lesser amount of money. 
The effect of a one year increase in age on the 
probability of taking the lump sum payment was a negative 
.0017.  This effect, although insignificant, was 
anticipated because, as officers age, their education and 
experience levels increase, making them better equipped to 
understand the financial difference between the two 
programs, which would encourage them to choose the annuity 
payment option since that plan provides the greatest 
monetary returns. 
YOS had a similar effect on the probability of an 
officer choosing the SSB separation option.  The effect of 
one more year of service was a negative .0707, and again 
this effect was insignificant.  While the significance of 
this variable was not anticipated, the negative influence 
was.  As an officer’s time in service increases, that 
individual would be better able to comprehend the monetary 
value of the annuity payment option over that of the lump 
sum payment.  This knowledge would help that officer make 
the most financially rewarding decision, which would be to 
select the VSI plan.  Also, as YOS increase, so does the 
amount of benefits that would be given up should the Marine 
take the lump sum payment. 
The effects of having a combat service support or 
aviation MOS were anticipated.  Compared to the base case, 
combat arms MOS, both combat service support and aviation 
MOS effects were negative, .0785 and .1065 respectively.  
While the effects were insignificant, the results do reveal 
that those officers in non-combat arms MOS do have a lesser 
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inclination to opt for current dollars, which would be 
expected since those officers are generally better educated 
and on average, older than Marines in combat arms MOSs. 
B. ENLISTED ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table 12 displays the estimation results for Marine 
enlisted: 
 









Intercept 5.0954 3.2671 0.1189 -0.0000 
SEP_1993 -0.1286 0.1392 0.3556 -0.0184 
SEP_1994 -1.0816 0.2551 <.00011 -0.2027 
FEMALE -0.3751 0.2013 0.06243 -0.0581 
BLK 0.3259 0.1210 0.00711 0.0400 
OTHER_MINORITY 0.5610 1.0802 0.6035 0.0634 
SINGLE -0.0334 0.1393 0.8104 -0.0046 
NUMBER_DEPENDENTS 0.0686 0.0357 0.05463 0.0009 
E4 -0.4608 0.4220 0.2749 -0.0733 
E6 -0.1469 0.1432 0.3048 -0.0212 
E7 -0.0488 0.2403 0.8392 -0.0068 
COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT -0.1387 0.1442 0.3363 -0.0200 
AVIATION -0.1971 0.1514 0.19304 -0.0289 
LT_HS_DIPLOMA -0.4550 0.6242 0.4661 -0.0722 
GT_HS_DIPLOMA -0.0257 0.1527 0.8662 -0.0036 
UNEMPLOYMENT_RATE 0.2099 0.2013 0.2970 0.0268 
AGE -0.0361 0.0210 0.08523 -0.0050 
YOS -0.1136 0.0458 0.01322 -0.0162 
BEDR -16.0714 19.5024 0.4099 -0.3308 
R-Squared 0.0764    
Max-rescaled R-Squared 0.1148    
Number of Observations 2747    
1 Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
2 Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. 
3 Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level. 
4 Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level, one-tail test. 
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The partial effects data reveal that those enlisted 
Marines who separated from active duty during 1994 were 
.2027 less likely to select the SSB payment than those 
enlisted personnel who separated in 1992, the base year.  
The negative effect of separating in 1994 was highly 
significant at all the usual levels (<.0001), ceteris 
paribus.  These results were anticipated because, as the 
advantages of taking the SSB over the VSI payment were 
eliminated by the Defense Authorization Act of 1993, the 
choice between the two options became solely based on the 
financial aspects of the different plans (Warner and 
Pleeter 2001, 36).  The enlisted Marines realized the 
transitional, intrinsic, and psychological benefits that 
had encouraged them to use high discount rates in 1992 did 
not exist in the following years and were therefore more 
likely to select the annuity payment plan.  The enlisted 
Marines chose the VSI program after 1992 since it was more 
financially beneficial to them to do so. 
The effects of gender determined by this study reveal 
that enlisted women do have a lower propensity to select a 
lump sum payment option than do enlisted men.  A female 
enlisted Marine was .0581 less likely to choose the SSB 
payment plan upon separation, and the variable for female 
proved to be significant at the 0.10 level (0.0624), 
ceteris paribus.  This study found that female enlisted 
Marines are less likely to choose the lump sum payment and 
to have lower personal discount rates.  There are two 
reasons why these results have been found.  The first 
reason that enlisted women have a lower propensity to take 
the SSB payment is due to the nature of the enlisted women 
in the data set.  The enlisted women in the data set are 
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older, 33 years of age on average, than the enlisted men in 
the data set, who average 32 years of age.  Economic theory 
notes that older individuals should discount income at a 
lower rate than younger people, since they place more value 
on future dollars (Mankiw 2004, 435).  Older Marines also 
discount at lower rates because they do not have as long a 
period of time in which to earn money, so they choose the 
most monetarily-beneficial payment option.  The second 
reason why enlisted women are likely to have a lower 
likelihood to take the lump sum payment is because their 
wages in a civilian job are likely to be lower than those 
of men (Ehrenberg and Smith 2003, 380).  Women Marines 
leaving the service could expect to earn less in their 
civilian employment, so they could not afford to take the 
lower amount of money offered by the lump sum payment 
option. 
Race proved to have a significant effect on an 
enlisted Marine’s separation payment option decision.  
Black enlisted Marines were 0.0400 more likely to choose 
the lump sum payment than white enlisted Marines.  The 
variable for black was highly significant at all levels 
(0.0071), ceteris paribus.  This finding was expected based 
on the results of previous studies, specifically Warner and 
Pleeter (2001), who found blacks to have a higher 
propensity to take lump sum payment and to correspondingly 
have higher personal discount rates.  In that same study, 
Warner and Pleeter propose that blacks may not be able to 
borrow money at low interest rates because they could be 
less educated or less financially well off.  They suggest 
that discrimination may be an influence on a minority 
member’s personal discount rate, because they will have to 
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increase their personal discount rates to compensate for 
only being able to borrow at higher rates (Warner and 
Pleeter 2001, 37). 
To evaluate the potential value of these hypotheses as 
explanations for the results found in this study, black and 
white enlisted Marines in the data set were compared and 
two interesting facts appeared.  First, the educational 
levels of the two races were very similar.  Blacks had a 
higher percentage of enlisted personnel with less than a 
high school diploma, 0.7 percent compared to 0.5 percent 
for whites.  Whites had the highest percentage of enlisted 
Marines with a high school equivalent degree, 11 percent; 
while blacks had 7 percent.  About 92 percent of black 
Marines had education beyond a high school diploma while 88 
percent of white enlisted Marines had more than a high 
school education.  These data imply that, at least in this 
sample, black enlisted Marines had on average, a higher 
educational level.  The higher education level implies that 
blacks would be more able to understand the benefits of an 
annuity payment, and therefore select that option; however, 
they still chose the lump sum payment more frequently.  
Education level then must not have been the overriding 
factor in the black enlisted payment option decision. 
Financial status may help explain the propensity of 
black enlisted Marines to select the lump sum payment 
option.  The financial status of each enlisted Marine was 
inferred from his or her rank.  Those Marines with higher 
rank are estimated to be better off financially than those 
of lower rank.  The data show that blacks have a higher 
percentage, 53.5 percent, of individuals in the two lowest 
ranks.  Whites have 49 percent of their number in the ranks 
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of corporal and sergeant.  The high percentage of blacks in 
the two lowest ranks implies that blacks are paid less, 
when compared to whites who are in the data set.  Black 
enlisted Marines might compensate for their lower pay by 
having higher personal discount rates.  The data confirm 
this because the average black enlisted predicted personal 
discount rate was 0.2541, which was 0.0178 higher than the 
average white enlisted rate of 0.2363. 
The number of dependents in a Marine’s family had a 
positive effect on that individual selecting the SSB 
payment.  For every increase by one in the number of 
dependents a Marine had, the likelihood of the SSB option 
being chosen increased by 0.0009.  This was a small effect, 
but it is significant at the 0.10 percent level (0.0546), 
ceteris paribus.  This result was anticipated.  The data 
show that at each level of number of dependents, which in 
the data set ranges from zero to twelve, the percentage of 
enlisted Marines who took the lump sum payment is 
consistently higher than those who opted for the annuity 
payment.  The only exception is at the eight-child level, 
where 50 percent of the Marines took the SSB payment and 
the other half took the VSI payment.  The higher percentage 
of enlisted personnel taking the lump sum payment indicates 
that Marines will more often take the SSB payment, no 
matter how many dependents they have.  This is believed to 
be true because Marines with larger families will have 
increased financial obligations during their transition out 
of the military.  These obligations will in turn encourage 
them to select the lump sum payment because it would 
provide current dollars to assist them during their move to 
the civilian sector. 
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A Marine’s MOS was found to affect his or her 
separation payment option decision.  Being in an aviation 
MOS had a negative effect of 0.0289 on the probability of 
that Marine taking the SSB payment.  The significance of 
this effect was minimal however, being significant at the 
0.10 level for a one tail test (0.0965), ceteris paribus.  
It is not surprising that a Marine’s MOS affected the 
separation payment option decision, nor is it surprising 
that being in an aviation MOS had a significant negative 
effect on choosing the SSB plan.  It was anticipated that 
Marines in aviation MOSs would have a lower propensity to 
choose the lump sum payment than Marines in combat arms MOS 
because of their higher level of education.  The percentage 
of aviation MOS Marines who had a level of education 
greater than that of a high school diploma was 91.7 
percent, which was 3.6 percent higher than combat arms MOS 
Marines and 2.8 percent greater than combat service support 
MOS enlisted.  The higher education level enabled the 
aviation Marines to better understand the benefits that 
would be provided by the VSI plan, resulting in more of 
them selecting the annuity payment since it offered more 
dollars in the long run.  The higher level of education was 
likely a key factor in the aviation Marine’s decision.  It 
may have overshadowed the fact that aviation Marines were, 
on average, two years younger than Marines in the other 
MOS; and the fact that they had one year less of service 
time on average than the other MOS Marines.  Both of these 
traits would influence a Marine to take the lump sum 
payment, so the effect of a higher education level had to 
be more significant than the other factors combined, 
because the aviation MOS Marines chose the annuity payment 
more often than they chose the SSB option. 
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As a Marine’s age increases by one year, the 
probability of that person selecting the SSB payment 
decreased by 0.0050, which proved to be significant at the 
0.10 percent level, ceteris paribus.  The data support the 
belief that older Marines would be more likely to select 
the annuity payment.  The data show that from age 30 
through 46, there is a decline in the percentage of SSB 
takers with every one-year increase in age.  Marines in 
this age bracket constitute 75.8 percent of the enlisted 
sample, which helps explain why there is the negative 
effect of age on taking the SSB option.  Another reason why 
older Marines would be less likely to select the lump sum 
payment is because they would be more educated and more 
capable of understanding the differences between the two 
different payment plans, and then use that knowledge to 
make the most beneficial decision, which would be to accept 
the VSI option.  The life cycle consumption theory proposes 
that older Marines can be expected to place more value on 
future benefits than present benefits, and to select future 
income over current dollars (Gilman 1976, 29). 
The number of years in the Marine Corps had a 
significant effect on an individual’s separation option 
decision.  YOS were found to have a negative effect on the 
probability of selecting the SSB option with each increase 
of one year of time in service.  The partial effect for the 
YOS variable was a negative 0.0162, which proved to be 
significant at the 0.05 level (0.0132), ceteris paribus.  
This effect was anticipated because as a Marine’s YOS 
increase, he or she would be forfeiting a larger amount of 
dollars by taking the lump sum payment option; so that 
individual should be persuaded to take the VSI payment 
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because of the higher monetary values that would come 
through that program.  The data show a second reason why an 
increase in YOS produces this negative effect on SSB 
selection.  This is because Marines with more time in 
service have, on average, higher levels of education.  As 
Marines spend time on active duty, they are able to attain 
higher levels of education which in turn makes them more 
capable of understanding the financial aspects of the SSB 
and VSI programs.  Their better education should also 
enable them to make a better decision about which option 
would result in the most benefits, and then make the 
decision in favor of the VSI program (Mankiw 2004, 6). 
C. PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATE ESTIMATES FOR OFFICERS 
The estimation results from Table 11 were used to 
predict a personal discount rate for each Marine officer in 
the sample.  The mean implied personal discount rates were 
estimated by using the model to predict each officer’s 
discount rate and then averaging them, based on the 
variables.  The initial officer model produced negative 
predicted personal discount rates.  The first approach to 
addressing this issue involved setting all negative 
personal discount rates to zero and leaving the officers in 
the data set.  The resulting average discount rates were 
low, indicating that this corrective method produced a 
negative bias, and was therefore not appropriate.  The mean 
implied personal discount rates listed in Table 13 below 
were determined by removing all officers with negative 
discount rates from the data set.  This methodology 
produced discount rates that are more consistent with the 
results found in previous studies. 
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Table 13.   Mean Implied PDR for Marine Officers 





SEPARATION YEAR    
  1993 0.1533 0.1024 152 
  1994 0.1127 0.0849 32 
GENDER    
  MALE 0.1461 0.1017 177 
  FEMALE 0.1497 0.0716 7 
RACE    
  WHITE 0.1397 0.0988 167 
  BLACK 0.2121 0.1108 11 
  AMERICAN INDIAN 0.2417 0.0000 1 
MARITAL STATUS    
  MARRIED 0.1392 0.0979 129 
  SINGLE 0.1628 0.1056 55 
  SINGLE W/DEPENDENTS 0.1817 0.1392 13 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS    
  0 - 3 0.1382 0.0890 147 
  > 3 0.1785 0.1339 37 
RANK    
  O3 0.1441 0.0991 165 
  O3E 0.1669 0.1164 18 
  FIELD GRADE 0.1268 0.0000 1 
MOS    
  COMBAT ARMS 0.1696 0.1095 82 
  COMBAT SERVICE SPT 0.1328 0.0981 55 
  AVIATION 0.1213 0.0776 47 
EDUCATION LEVEL    
  BACHELOR’S DEGREE 0.1463 0.1006 184 
  GRADUATE EDUCATION 0.0000 0.0000 0 
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UNEMPLOYMENT RATE    
  5.5 – 6.4 0.1103 0.0851 31 
  6.5 – 7.1 0.1346 0.0973 121 
  7.2– 7.8 0.2251 0.0885 32 
AGE    
  27 - 30 0.1725 0.1105 40 
  31 - 35 0.1415 0.0937 124 
  36 - 40 0.1203 0.1179 19 
  41 - 44 0.1814 0.0000 1 
YOS    
  4 - 10 0.1549 0.1029 148 
  11 - 15 0.1118 0.0831 34 
  16 - 22 0.0949 0.0970 2 
BEDR    
  6 – 13.99 0.2417 0.0000 1 
  14 – 14.99 0.1797 0.1011 54 
  15 – 15.99 0.1395 0.1017 93 
  16 – 16.99 0.1109 0.0824 36 
 
There are several interesting features in the results 
displayed in Table 13.  There is a decrease in the average 
personal discount rate as the number of years increased 
since the start of the programs, with the average personal 
discount rate dropping 0.0406 percent between 1993 and 
1994.  The dropping in average personal discount rates does 
not mean however, that more officers were choosing the VSI 
program.  Even though the average personal discount rate 
decreased over time, the larger percentage of Marine 
officers continued to prefer current dollars over future 
dollars, but they were doing so at lower discount rates.  
That is the cause for the lower personal discount rates 
seen over time, not the fact that the VSI program was being 
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chosen more often.  The separating officers needed current 
dollars to fund their transition from the Marine Corps, and 
they were willing to discount those current funds at lower 
discount rates. 
The female officer average personal discount rate, 
.1497, was higher than the average for male officers, 
.1461.  This result was surprising because it had been 
anticipated that women would have the lower rate.  It is 
likely that a woman would earn less than a man while 
employed in the civilian sector, and would therefore be 
more likely to take the VSI options since it would provide 
her with more money (Ehrenberg and Smith 2003, 380). 
Officers who are members of a minority group revealed 
a higher personal discount rate than did white officers.  
Black officers had an average discount rate of .2121, which 
is a full 7.24 percent higher than the average white 
officer’s personal discount rate.  This suggests that black 
officers have a very high inclination towards current 
dollars. 
The data show that those officers with more dependents 
have higher personal discount rates, on average, than those 
Marines with fewer dependents.  Officers with more than 
three dependents had an average discount rate of 17.85 
percent, which was 4.03 percent higher than officers with 
zero to two dependents.  This result was anticipated 
because those officers with more children would need more 
immediate financial support during his or her transition to 
civilian employment.  This fact then, should encourage them 
to select the lump sum payment, which has a higher 
associated personal discount rate than the annuity payment. 
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Single officers with dependents had the highest 
average personal discount rate of all family status 
categories.  The average for this group of officers was 
0.1817 percent, and was 0.0425 percent higher than married 
officers and 0.0189 percent higher than single officers 
without dependents.  This indicates that those officers who 
were not married, but responsible for dependents used 
higher personal discount rates in their payment option 
decisions than married and single officers without 
dependents did.  The higher personal discount rates used by 
single officers with dependents are believed to show that 
these officers compensated for the lack of financial 
support that a spouse can provide, by using higher discount 
rates. 
Prior enlisted Marine captains had the highest average 
personal discount rates, .1669, when compared to those 
officers without enlisted service.  Field grade officers 
had the lowest average rate of .1268, with captains falling 
between at .1441.  This result was not anticipated because 
the prior enlisted captains were on average, older and had 
more time in service than Marines in the other two ranks.  
These traits should have encouraged prior service captains 
to choose the VSI payment option because they would be 
better educated and more able to understand the financial 
alternatives, plus they would be giving up more money by 
choosing the SSB plan.  It appears that the number of 
dependents was the key factor in the prior service 
captain’s decision.  This group of officers had, on 
average, three dependents compared to the other ranks that 
averaged two.  It seems plausible that the higher number of 
dependents encouraged the prior service captains to take 
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the lump sum payment because it gave them money in the 
present with which he or she could support their family 
during the transition out of the Marine Corps. 
Marines in combat arms MOSs have the highest average 
personal discount rate at .1696.  This rate is .0368 and 
.0483 higher than the rates for Marines in combat service 
support and aviation MOSs, respectively.  This was 
anticipated because the average officer in a combat arms 
MOS was 32 years old, and younger individuals are expected 
to have higher personal discount rates since they generally 
have a longer period of time to earn money, than those 
Marines who are older.  The following table highlights the 
ages and educational levels of Marine officers broken down 
by MOS: 
 
Table 14.   Age and Education Levels by MOS for Marine Officers 
MOS AGE EDUCATION LEVEL 














32.8 2.2311 55 10 0.0000 55 
Aviation 32.1 1.9430 47 10 0.0000 47 
 
The results for graduate education show that those 
officers with only a bachelor’s degree had an average 
personal discount rate of 0.1463.  The absence of any 
officers with higher educational levels with positive 
discount rates indicates that officers with graduate 
                     1 The number 10 represents a bachelor’s degree level of education. 
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education were highly disinclined towards selecting the SSB 
payment, and therefore highly probable to have low personal 
discount rates.  Even those 16 officers with graduate 
degrees who did take the SSB payment used negative discount 
rates in their payment option decision. 
Evaluating the unemployment rates faced by separating 
Marines reveals that as the unemployment rates increased, 
officers used increasingly higher personal discount rates 
to compensate for their anticipated higher level of 
difficulty in finding civilian employment.  Those Marines 
facing higher unemployment rates were more likely to choose 
the SSB payment option because they desired current dollars 
for use immediately after separation.  Their higher 
likelihood to take the lump sum payment reveals that they 
were using higher discount rates in their separation 
decisions, so naturally the data would show higher personal 
discount rates as the unemployment rates increased. 
The age of a Marine officer has a negative effect on 
personal discount rates.  The youngest group of officers, 
27 to 30 years of age, has an average discount rate of 
.1725.  This rate is .0310 and .0522 higher than the 
following two age brackets.  It was expected that younger 
officers would have higher personal discount rates because 
they took the lump sum payment more frequently than older 
officers, indicating a preference for current dollars to 
fund the costs during the time of separation. 
Marine officers who had the most time in service had 
the lowest average personal discount rate, .0949, compared 
to officers with four to ten YOS, .1549, and to officers 
with 11 – 15 YOS, .1115.  This was expected because the 
more senior Marines would give up a large amount of money 
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by selecting the SSB payment, so he or she would be likely 
to choose the annuity payment plan in order to retain as 
much of the benefits as possible.  The following table 
highlights the ages and educational levels of Marine 
officers broken down by YOS: 
 
Table 15.   Age and Education Levels by YOS for Marine Officers 




















35.5 0.7071 2 10 0.0000 2 
 
As an officer’s BEDR increases, there is a decrease in 
the average personal discount rate.  This negative effect 
is anticipated because as an individual’s discount rate 
increases to equate the present value of the lump sum 
payment to the present value of the annuity payment, they 
become less likely to select the SSB plan.  The preference 
for the annuity payment results in low personal discount 
rates because annuity payments are generally discounted at 
lower rates. 
                     1 The number 10 represents a bachelor’s degree level of education. 
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D. PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATE ESTIMATES FOR ENLISTED 
The estimation results from Table 12 were used to 
predict a personal discount rate for each enlisted Marine 
in the sample.  The models were used to predict each 
Marine’s discount rate, and then these rates were averaged 
to determine the mean implied personal discount rates, 
based on the variables listed below in Table 16. 
 
Table 16.   Mean Implied PDR for Marine Enlisted 





SEPARATION YEAR    
  1992 0.2559 0.0299 1231 
  1993 0.2365 0.0308 1340 
  1994 0.1600 0.0288 175 
  1997 0.2115 0.0000 1 
GENDER    
  MALE 0.2416 0.0379 2599 
  FEMALE 0.2181 0.0319 148 
RACE    
  WHITE 0.2363 0.0372 2012 
  ASIAN 0.2972 0.0108 4 
  BLACK 0.2541 0.0376 594 
  HAWAIIAN PACIFIC 0.2874 0.0052 2 
  AMERICAN INDIAN 0.2750 0.0357 3 
  OTHER MINORITY 0.2876 0.0217 9 
MARITAL STATUS    
  MARRIED 0.2411 0.0382 2240 
  SINGLE 0.2368 0.0367 507 
NUMBER OF DEPENDENTS    
  0 – 3 0.2405 0.0381 2115 
  > 3 0.2400 0.0376 632 
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RANK    
  E4 0.2753 0.0139 115 
  E5 0.2632 0.0268 1268 
  E6 0.2168 0.0335 1175 
  E7 0.2116 0.0240 189 
MOS    
  COMBAT ARMS 0.2486 0.0350 405 
  COMBAT SERVICE SPT 0.2354 0.0388 1303 
  AVIATION 0.2433 0.0373 1039 
EDUCATION LEVEL    
  LT HS DIPLOMA 0.2221 0.0293 14 
  EQUIV HS DIPLOMA 0.2299 0.0367 274 
  GT HS DIPLOMA 0.2416 0.0380 2459 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE    
  5.2 – 6.5 0.2158 0.0352 204 
  6.6 – 7.3 0.2321 0.0378 1600 
  7.4 – 7.8 0.2596 0.0301 943 
AGE    
  22 – 30 0.2705 0.0225 989 
  31 – 35 0.2318 0.0312 1303 
  36 – 40 0.2017 0.0300 394 
  41 - 46 0.1833 0.0306 61 
YOS    
  4 – 10 0.2779 0.0202 599 
  11 – 15 0.2390 0.0315 1671 
  16 - 21 0.1979 0.0271 477 
BEDR    
  6 – 10.99 0.3122 0.0107 2 
  11 – 14.99 0.2863 0.0173 270 
  15 – 15.99 0.2708 0.0195 327 
  16 - 16.99 0.2299 0.0350 2148 
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The average personal discount rate for enlisted 
Marines decreased over the period of 1992 to 1994.  The 
high personal discount rate average of 0.2559 in 1992 can 
be attributed to the difference in benefit packages offered 
by the two programs.  Since the SSB plan provided more 
intrinsic and psychological benefits than the VSI program 
did, it encouraged Marines to select the lump sum payment 
option over the VSI plan, creating essentially a bias 
towards the lump sum payment.  Since lump sum payments are 
associated with higher discount rates, it is no surprise 
that for 1992 there is a high average personal discount 
rate for those Marines who separated during that year.  The 
1993 and 1994 separation year average personal discount 
rates decrease due to the fact that the benefits that 
biased the choice towards the SSB program were eliminated.  
With the greater non-monetary benefits removed, the choice 
of option was then based on fiscal benefits, which are 
clearly greater from the annuity option. 
The female average personal discount rate proved to be 
lower than the average for men by 0.0235 percent.  The 
lower rate for females can be attributed to the fact that 
the women in the data set are on average, older, and that 
women have been found to value larger amounts of money 
associated with annuity separation payments because they 
are likely to earn less in a civilian job, and therefore 
need more money to make up for that anticipated difference 
in pay (Ehrenberg and Smith 2003, 380). 
Minority groups produced the highest personal discount 
rate averages than non-minorities.  Marines who were Asian, 
American Indian, and Hawaiian/Pacific Islanders had the 
highest personal discount rate average of 0.2876, but the 
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number of Marines in this category was small.  Black 
enlisted Marines had a lower personal discount rate 
average, 0.2541, indicating that there is a clear 
preference towards current dollars among black enlisted 
Marines.  Black Marines were more likely to take the SSB 
payment than white Marines, and that produced the higher 
personal discount rates for blacks, 0.2541 percent compared 
to 0.2363, respectively. 
As an enlisted Marine’s number of dependents 
increased, the average personal discount rate decreased 
slightly.  Those Marines with zero to three dependents had 
an average discount rate of .2405, which is only marginally 
higher than the average rate of Marines with more than 
three dependents, .2400.  The closeness of the two averages 
indicates that enlisted personnel discount current dollars 
at approximately the same rate 
The hierarchy of average personal discount rates 
determined for the enlisted ranks was anticipated.  The 
lowest ranking Marines, corporals, had the highest average 
discount rate of .2753, while the most senior enlisted 
Marines, gunnery sergeants, had the lowest average rates of 
.2116.  Sergeants and staff sergeants placed in between 
with average discount rates of .2632 and .2168, 
respectively.  These results were expected because those 
Marines with a lower rank would generally have less 
education that could help them understand the financial 
comparison being made between the two separation payment 
plans.  Junior Marines would also be younger, which is a 
trait that encourages taking current dollars because he or 
she would potentially have more time to earn money than an 
older Marine.  The more senior Marines would be expected to 
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have lower personal discount rates because the amount of 
future dollars that he or she would be opting out of is 
much greater the higher in rank one becomes.  Another 
factor that influenced these results involves race.  Black 
Marines made up a larger percentage of the lowest ranks 
than whites did.  Blacks have been found to have higher 
personal discount rates on average than white enlisted 
Marines.  It is no surprise then, that the two ranks 
containing the higher proportion of blacks would have the 
highest average rates.  The opposite is true for the two 
highest ranks, where there is a larger white population.  
The average personal discount rates in these ranks are 
lower because there are more white enlisted Marines in 
these categories, with lower rates, which lessen the 
overall average discount rate. 
Enlisted Marines with an aviation MOS were found to 
have lower average personal discount rates than Marines in 
combat arms MOS, by an average of 0.0053 percent.  Aviation 
Marines used lower discount rates in their separation 
option decisions because of their higher educational 
levels, relative to the base case of combat arms MOS, which 
enabled them to better understand the choice being made 
between the SSB and VSI programs.  They understood that the 
VSI option provides more value over time, and were 
therefore more likely to take the annuity payment which 
resulted in lower personal discount rates.  The table below 





Table 17.   Age and Education Levels by MOS for Enlisted Marines 
MOS AGE EDUCATION LEVEL 














32.7 3.5796 1303 3 1.7870 1303 
Aviation 31.4 3.6748 1039 3 1.4972 1039 
 
Enlisted Marine education levels produced the opposite 
results of what was expected.  Those enlisted personnel 
with levels of education greater than a high school diploma 
had higher personal discount rates on average, .2416, than 
those with high school diplomas, .2299, and those who had 
no high school diploma, .2221.  Individuals with higher 
education should be better able to understand the benefits 
of the annuity payment and then choose that option since it 
provides more monetary benefits to the Marine.  This is not 
what is seen happening, indicating that those Marines in 
the top educational level have a greater preference for 
current dollars than those personnel with lower levels of 
education.  A possible explanation for these results could 
be the fact that the Marines in the highest education 
bracket faced the highest average unemployment rate upon 
separation from the service.  It appears that these 
enlisted personnel placed a higher value on current money, 
to facilitate their transition to a new occupation, than 
they did on future benefits.  The average rank for Marines 
in this educational level was between a corporal and 
                     1 The number 3 represents that a Marine has earned an occupational 
certification, the level of education above a high school diploma. 
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sergeant, indicating that these individuals were in the 
lowest ranks, which tend to have higher personal discount 
rates on average than more senior ranks. 
The unemployment rates faced by enlisted Marines 
leaving the service affected personal discount rates.  The 
results here were consistent with what was found for the 
officers; as unemployment rates increased, enlisted 
personnel used higher personal discount rates to compensate 
for their expected increased level of difficulty in 
locating employment in the civilian sector.  Marines in the 
highest unemployment rate bracket, 7.4 to 7.8, had on 
average, a discount rate of .2596, which was 4.28 and 2.75 
percent larger than the rates used by individuals in the 
5.2 to 6.5 and 6.6 to 7.3 brackets, respectively.  Other 
factors that could be influencing the discount rates used 
by Marines in the unemployment ranges are age, YOS and 
rank.  The average age for Marines in the highest 
unemployment rate group was 31, two years younger than the 
Marines in the other two groups.  Younger individuals 
generally use higher personal discount rates, and this may 
contribute to the high discount rate average seen among the 
7.4 to 7.8 percent unemployment rate group.  Marines who 
faced the highest unemployment rates also had on average, 
the least amount of active duty time and the lowest ranks.  
Again, those individuals with less time in service and 
lower ranks are generally younger and less educated, which 
makes the propensity of using higher personal discount 
rates in their financial decisions more likely. 
There is a decrease in average personal discount rates 
as enlisted Marines get older.  Younger Marines have a 
preference for current dollars that produces high personal 
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discount rate averages, but as a Marine ages, that 
preference for current money diminishes so there is a 
corresponding drop in personal discount rates.  There is a 
consistent decrease in discount rates starting at age 25, 
0.2917 percent, that continues until age 39, 0.1905 
percent.  Beyond age 40, the personal discount rates vary 
somewhat, but even then there is still a downward pattern.  
These results are in keeping with the anticipated effect of 
age and education on a Marine’s separation option decision. 
Years of service have similar effects on personal 
discount rates.  As the number of years in service 
increase, there is a general decrease in personal discount 
rates.  Five years in service had the highest discount rate 
with 0.3197, while year 21 had the lowest rate at .01280.  
This general decrease in personal discount rates was 
expected because as a Marine stays in the service longer, 
he or she would forfeit larger amounts of money by choosing 
the SSB payment, and would therefore be more likely to opt 
for the VSI program since it offers the most financial 
benefit.  Marines with more time on active duty would also 
have higher education levels than less senior individuals.  
Higher education enables the Marines with more time in 
service to make more competent financial decisions that are 
based on their better understanding of the monetary aspects 
of the SSB and VSI programs.  The table below highlights 





Table 18.   Age and Education Levels by YOS for Enlisted Marines 




















36.5 2.5227 477 3 1.7124 477 
 
There is a decrease in average personal discount rates 
as BEDR increase for enlisted Marines, similar to the 
results seen in the officer data.  The preference of the 
lump sum payment decreases as individuals increase his or 
her personal discount rates to solve the present value of 
an annuity equation.  The increased preference for the VSI 
separation option decreases the average personal discount 
rate since lower discount rates are associated with 
annuity-type payment. 
E. COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS STUDIES 
The results of this study are consistent with the 
findings reported by Warner and Pleeter (2001) and Mackin 
(1995), who constructed similar models for the other 
branches of service.  Table 15 is a comparison of this 
study’s results with those of Warner and Pleeter, and 
Mackin. 
                     1 The number 3 represents that a Marine has earned an occupational 
certification, the level of education above a high school diploma. 
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Officer All YOS 0.190 0.146 0.146 0.1006 184 
 YOS 9 0.191 0.147 0.154 0.1122 51 
 YOS 12 0.188 0.149 0.143 0.0827 4 
 YOS 15 0.183 0.155 0.019 0.0000 1 
 YOS 18 0.182 0.155 0.026 0.0000 1 
Enlisted All YOS 0.233 0.209 0.240 0.0380 2747 
 YOS 9 0.234 0.209 0.276 0.0204 112 
 YOS 12 0.232 0.209 0.250 0.0243 349 
 YOS 15 0.229 0.205 0.208 0.0292 315 
 YOS 18 0.225 0.202 0.187 0.0270 81 
(After Mackin 1995, 11) 
The Marine results show that, on average, the personal 
discount rates determined in this study are consistent with 
past estimates.  The average officer personal discount rate 
estimated here was 0.1463, and the range of rates for 
officers was from 0.0002 to 0.4925.  Enlisted personnel had 
rates that ranged from 0.0993 to 0.3384, with their average 
personal discount rate being 0.2403.  The noticeable 
differences between the Marine data and the previous 
results are in YOS 15 and 18 for the officers.  In the 
Marine data, there was only one individual in each of those 
year groups with a positive discount rate.  This fact makes 
the personal discount rates shown suspect, because that 
individual is not representative of all Marines who have 
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the same amount of time in service.  The personal discount 
rate at 16 YOS for the Marines was 0.1635, which is in line 
with the other results.  This study’s estimate of enlisted 
personal discount rates are more consistent with Warner and 
Pleeter’s rates per years of service in that both studies 
have rates that decrease over time, whereas Mackin’s 
averages slightly increase with tenure. 
This study has not resulted in any findings that would 
surprise those who are familiar with personal discount 
rates.  Based on the estimates, it appears that the Marines 
who separated from the service during the DOD drawdown used 
approximately the same personal discount rates, in their 
separation payment option decisions, as did those men and 
women in the other branches of service.  The findings in 
this study do provide a foundation for future personal 
discount rate evaluations that are Marine Corps specific; 
and it compliments the evaluations done by Warner and 
Pleeter (2001) and Mackin (1995) because it provides the 
Marine Corps data that those studies lacked. 
The closeness of the results in all three evaluations 
shows that the methodology is appropriate and that the 
personal discount rates used by servicemen and women are 
generally the same across the four services.  This implies 
then, that manpower planners can develop separation and 
retention policies based on the estimated personal discount 
rates found here, and can transfer similar policies to 
other services. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The officer and enlisted models used in this study 
produced findings that were both expected and others that 
were not anticipated.  In terms of personal 
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characteristics, both models found the year in which an 
officer or enlisted Marine separated to be a significant 
factor in the separation program decision.  For officers, 
1992 had a significant negative influence on the SSB option 
being chosen, while 1994 had a strong positive effect on an 
enlisted Marine’s discount rate choice.  Gender and race 
did not have a significant effect on an officer’s payment 
option choice, but for enlisted Marines both of these 
characteristics were very significant factors in the 
decision making process.  Likewise, the number of 
dependents was a significant part of an enlisted Marine’s 
decision, but officers did not seem to be influenced in 
their payment choice by the number of dependents they have. 
Surprisingly, rank did not weigh significantly on the 
separation payment decision for either officers or enlisted 
Marines.  Educational levels were expected to be 
significant factors in a Marine’s payment choice.  This 
hypothesis proved true for officers, because those with a 
graduate level education or higher were significantly less 
likely to choose the SSB payment.  Enlisted Marines however 
were not significantly influenced in their payment option 
decision by their level of education. 
Unemployment rates faced at the time of separation 
were expected to be influential on the decision about which 
option a Marine would select.  Officers were more likely to 
take the SSB payment as unemployment rates rose, presumably 
to receive current dollars with which they can fund their 
transition to civilian employment.  Enlisted Marines were 
not significantly influenced in their payment option 
decision by the unemployment rate they would face.  This 
may indicate that the groups would be seeking different 
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types of jobs.  Since unemployment rates were not 
influencing enlisted Marines, this could also mean that the 
employment pursued by enlisted Marines was easier to obtain 
than those jobs sought after by separating officers.  
Military occupational specialties were expected to be an 
influence on which separation payment a Marine would 
choose.  This was not true at all for officers, and only 
marginally true for enlisted Marines who had aviation MOS. 
Age and YOS were significant factors influencing an 
enlisted Marine’s separation option decision, but these 
characteristics were not influential for officers making 
the same decision.  Single officers who had dependents were 
positively influenced to select the SSB payment, but 
enlisted Marines were not. 
The personal discount rates estimated here are 
consistent with those produced by previous studies.  The 
estimated personal discount rates vary widely for officers, 
but their average of 0.1463 falls in between those of 
Warner and Pleeter, and Mackin.  The enlisted average 
personal discount rate here is higher than that of previous 
studies, but the difference relative to the other studies 
is less than one percent, indicating that the individuals 
who separated from Marine Corps during the drawdown used 
approximately the same personal discount rates as their 
counterparts in the other branches of service.  The 
closeness of estimated personal discount rates across the 
services implies that manpower planners can transfer 
estimated rates across the services as they write policies 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This research determined the discount rate that each 
individual Marine used to exchange present dollars for 
future dollars during severance from the Marine Corps under 
either the VSI or SSB voluntary separation payment programs 
between 1992 and 1997.  This study also determined those 
professional, personal and economic factors that 
significantly influenced Marines in their separation 
payment option decisions.  Once estimated, the personal 
discount rates were compared to rates found in earlier 
studies to determine the accuracy of the estimates and to 
see if there is any potential applicability to the other 
branches of service.  This study compliments the study done 
by Warner and Pleeter (2001) because it estimates the 
personal discount rates of Marines who were omitted from 
that study due to improper reporting. 
The probability of selecting the lump sum payment 
option is estimated as a function of these personal, 
professional, and economic traits defined by the model: 
 
• Separation in 1992,  
• Separation in 1993,  
• Separation in 1994,  
• Separation in 1995,  
• Separation in 1996,  
• Separation in 1997,  
• Male,  
• Female,  
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• White,  
• Asian,  
• Black,  
• Hawaiian/Pacific Islands,  
• American Indian/Alaskan Native,  
• Other Minority,  
• Single,  
• Single with Dependents,  
• Married,  
• Number of Dependents,  
• E4,  
• E5,  
• E6,  
• E7,  
• O3,  
• O3E,  
• Field Grade,  
• Combat Arms,  
• Combat Service Support,  
• Aviation,  
• Less than High School Diploma,  
• Equivalent of High School Diploma,  
• Greater than High School Diploma,  
• Bachelor’s Degree,  
• Graduate Education,  
• Unemployment Rate,  
• Age,  




The methodology used to determine the personal 
discount rates for the Marines closely followed that used 
by Warner and Pleeter(2001) and Mackin(1995), but focused 
only on Marine Corps officer and enlisted personnel who 
separated under the two voluntary separation payment plans.  
Using data provided by the Marine Corps’ Total Force Data 
Warehouse, personal and professional traits of the 494 
officers and 2,747 enlisted Marines who separated were 
collected and used to determine a break-even discount rate 
that equated the present value of the SSB payment with the 
present value of the VSI payment.  This information was 
added to the data set and then a probit model and a logit 
model were run to estimate, separately, the coefficients 
for officers and enlisted personnel.  These coefficients 
were then used to calculate individual personal discount 
rates for every Marine.  The officer data best conformed to 
a probit model’s distribution, while a logit model best 
described the enlisted Marine data. 
The estimated personal discount rates determined by 
this study averaged 14.63 percent for officers and 24.03 
percent for enlisted Marines.  These results coincide 
closely with those of Cylke et al. who found discount rates 
of approximately 17 percent (Cylke et al. 1982, 17), and 
also Warner and Pleeter who estimated enlisted personal 
discount rates to be between 35 to 54 percent and officer 
rates to range between 10 to 19 percent (Warner and Pleeter 
2001, 48).  The Mackin study results were also similar as 
they estimated officer personal discount rates of 
approximately 14 percent and enlisted rates of 




This study has several strengths.  The separation 
option decisions made by the Marines in the data set are 
based on real choices and large amounts of money, taking 
advantage of the natural experiment that resulted from 
having to choose between the annuity and lump sum voluntary 
separation options.  The Marines involved in making the 
choices are also a good representation of American society 
as a whole, with respect to earnings, education levels, and 
other personal attributes.  The personal discount rates 
estimated in this study are similar to those found in 
earlier studies, revealing that the methodology used to 
determine the rates in this study is appropriate and can be 
used again for future personal discount rate evaluations. 
The similar rates found for Marines and the other 
branches of service imply that the rates estimated here can 
be transferred to the other services and used in 
establishing manpower policies that deal with separation 
and retention payment issues.  Based on the personal 
discount rate estimates and the influential variables found 
in this study, the Marine Corps can predict the discount 
rates for each Marine and from that create appropriate 
force-shaping tools.  Manpower planners can create 
incentives that either encourages separation or retention, 
depending on the needs of the Marine Corps at the time.  
Being able to determine the approximate amount of money 
that would be required to encourage Marines to leave or 
stay can prevent the Marine Corps from paying excessive 
consumer surpluses to separating or reenlisting Marines, 
and will enable the Marine Corps to determine in advance, 
an incentive’s effect on a particular demographic group 
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(Mackin 1995, 6).  Knowing the personal traits that 
influence a Marine’s decision will prove useful in 
recruiting profiles, and these influential factors can also 
be targeted for improvement, which in turn will positively 
influence Marines to remain in the service. 
Selection bias is an issue in this study because TFDW 
could only provide the data on those Marines who chose to 
leave the service.  Marines who were eligible for either 
program, but decided to remain on active duty are not 
included in the regression models.  The inability to 
compare these two groups of Marines could result in 
overestimating the personal discount rates being used since 
only Marines who used high personal discount rates in their 
separation option decision would be evaluated in the data.  
Those Marines who used lower discount rates are not seen 
because they remained in the service. 
Omitted variable bias could also be an issue in this 
study.  It was not possible to determine an accurate “cost 
of leaving” value since the Marine Corps did not track the 
earnings that the Marine expected to receive in their 
future civilian employment.  A “cost of leaving” variable 
is probably positively correlated with selection of the SSB 
separation option.  As the cost of separating from the 
service increases, an individual would be more likely to 
take the lump sum payment so he or she would have current 
funds available to use in the transition to civilian 
employment.  The BEDR variable in the model captures the 
monetary effect on the probability of selecting the SSB 
plan, and this variable has been found to be negatively 
correlated with the probability of choosing the lump sum 
payment.  Therefore, it is likely that omitting the “cost 
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of leaving” variable has created a negative or downward, 
bias effect on at least one of the coefficient estimates 
(Wooldridge 2003, 92). 
The models in this study evaluate only the money 
received from taking the lump sum or annuity payment 
options.  The total compensation a Marine would receive by 
taking one plan over the other is not a variable in the 
models.  The probable effect of compensation on the 
dependent variable is likely to be negatively correlated.  
The greater the total compensation, the less likely it 
would be for a Marine to select the SSB payment.  The BEDR 
variable, which measures the monetary aspects of the 
models, is also negatively correlated with the probability 
of selecting the lump sum payment.  Based on these two 
relationships, it is likely that the lack of a total 
compensation variable in the models has produced a positive 
or upward bias in at least one coefficient in the models 
(Wooldridge 2003, 92). 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that further studies on personal 
discount rates be conducted.  There are two reasons for 
this.  First, manpower planners need to have the current 
discount rates being used by Marines.  The rates determined 
in this study were based on data that are 14 years old, and 
which may not now accurately reflect the rates currently 
being used by Marines today.  Having the contemporary 
discount rates will enable manpower planners to create 
policies that will most effectively shape the desired force 
of tomorrow.  Another reason why further research should be 
done in this area is to determine whether or not those 
traits that influence a Marine’s financial decisions change 
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over time.  The demographic characteristics that influenced 
the Marines in this study may not have the same impact on 
those individuals serving today.  The characteristics that 
affect a Marine’s decision about differing sums of money 
may change, and it is important for planners to know and 
understand these changes to create manpower policies that 
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